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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS
HERBERT HOVENKAMP
CHAPTER 8 (2d ed)
INNOVATION, IP RIGHTS, AND ANTICOMPETITIVE
EXCLUSION
CONTINENTAL PAPER BAG COMPANY v. EASTERN PAPER
BAG COMPANY
210 U.S. 405 (1908)
[Justice McKenna gave this statement of the case:]
This is a bill in equity to restrain the infringement of letters patent No.
558,969, issued to William Liddell for an improvement in paper bag
machines, for making what are designated in the trade as self-opening
square bags. The claims in suit do not include mechanism for making a
complete bag, but only mechanism for distending one end of a tucked or
bellows-folded paper tube made by other mechanism, and folding it down
into a form known in the art as the ‘diamond fold.’ This fold is flattened and
pasted by other mechanism and forms a square bottom to the bag.
The allegation of the answer as to the jurisdiction of the court is as
follows:
‘The defendant says, on information, advice, and belief, that a court of
equity has no jurisdiction to grant any prayer of the bill of complaint, even
if the said Liddell patent, No. 558,969, were valid, and even if the
defendant’s paper bag machines were to be held to infringe that patent;
because the said patent, No. 558,969, is a mere paper proposition which the
complainant has never put into effect or use, and because it is contrary to
equity to suppress a useful and established business, like that which the
defendant is prosecuting with its paper bag machines, at the request of a
complainant which simply owns one paper bag machine patent that has
never been employed by that complainant in any way in any paper bag
machinery, and because the complainant in this case has a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy at law for any infringement which may have been
done upon Liddell letters patent, No. 558,969.’
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Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:
The defense of want of invention in the Liddell machine is not urged
here, because it is said that the decision of that question depends upon
mechanical comparisons, too numerous and complicated to be conveniently
made by a bench of judges, and because, though the Liddell patent
approaches closely the prior art, it ‘perhaps covers a margin of
differentiation sufficient, though barely sufficient, to constitute invention.’
Th[e] point of law, it is further said, has been formulated in a decision
of this court as follows: ‘Where the patent does not embody a primary
invention, but only an improvement on the prior art, and defendant’s
machines can be differentiated, the charge of infringement is not sustained.’
Counsel for respondent do not contend that the Liddell invention is primary
within the definition given of that term by petitioner. Their concession is
that it is ‘not basic, in the sense of covering the first machine ever produced
to make self-opening square bags by machinery.’ They do contend,
however, that it is one of high rank, and, if it be given a ‘fair construction
and scope, no matter whether we call it basic, primary, or broad, or even
merely entitled to be construed as covering obvious mechanical equivalents,
the question of infringement of the claims in suit by petitioner’s machine
becomes mechanically, and from a patent-law standpoint, a simple one, in
spite of slight differences of operation, and of reversal of some of the
moving parts.’ The lower courts did not designate the invention as either
primary or secondary. They did, however, as we shall presently see, decide
that it was one of high rank and entitled to a broad range of equivalents. It
becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the point of law upon which
petitioner contends the question of infringement depends…..
If the invention is broad or primary in its character, the range of
equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal construction
which the courts give to such inventions.’ And this was what was decided in
Kokomo Fence Mach. Co. v. Kitselman, 189 U.S. 8 (1903), Cimiotti
Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399 (1905), and
Computing Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Co. 204 U. S. 609 (1907). It is
from the second of those cases, as we have seen, that the citation is made
which petitioner contends the point of law upon which infringement
depends is formulated; but it was said in that case: ‘It is well settled that a
greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents are permitted
where the patent is of a pioneer character than when the invention is simply
an improvement, maybe the last and successful step, in the art theretofore
partially developed by other inventors in the same field.’
It is manifest, therefore, that it was not meant to decide that only pioneer
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patents are entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents, but that it was
decided that the range of equivalents depends upon and varies with the
degree of invention…. We start, then, with the proposition that the Eastern
Company may invoke for the Liddell patent the doctrine of equivalents; but,
without deciding now how broadly, we proceed to the consideration of the
question of infringement. Invention is conceded to the Liddell machine, as
we have seen, by the Continental Company. The concession, however, is
qualified by the assertion that it covers only a ‘margin of differentiation’
from the prior art. The circuit court and the circuit court of appeals had a
higher estimate of it. The circuit court said that the nature of its invention
was ‘clear . . . [was] disconnected from what precedes it by such a hiatus
that, if the claims are as extensive as the invention, there is no difficulty so
far as concerns the application to the case of the rules with reference to
equivalents.’ And answering the contention that it was the twentieth in the
line of patents in its branch of the arts, and that it should be limited to the
details described in its specifications, it was said that there was ‘such hiatus
between them and what appears on the face of the Liddell patent that they
have no effect either in narrowing or broadening the alleged Liddell
invention.’ The circuit court of appeals affirmed the decree of the circuit
court. It was less circumstantial than the circuit court in describing the
invention. It said, however, after stating the claims, that their breadth
‘would imperil the patent, were the real invention less broad; but the
defendant [the Continental Company] has not pointed out, and we have
been unable to find, any operative combination of a rotary cylinder and a
forming plate oscillating thereon earlier than the patent in suit. If, therefore,
the patent is valid, it has a wide scope, and the mechanical arrangement
used by the defendant is fairly within its terms.’ The lower courts, therefore,
found that the invention was a broad one, and that the machine used by the
Continental Company was an infringement. To decide the question of
invention an examination of the prior art was necessary, and a consideration
of what step in advance of that art, if any, the Liddell patent was. To decide
the question of infringement a comparison of the Liddell machine with the
machine used by the Continental Company was necessary and a
determination of their similarity or difference.
The bill alleges the infringement of claims 1, 2, and 7…. Claim 1 is as
follows: ‘In a paper bag machine, the combination of a rotating cylinder
provided with one or more pairs of side-folding fingers adapted to be
moved toward or from each other, a forming plate also provided with sideforming fingers adapted to be moved toward of from each other, means for
operating said fingers at definite times during the formative action upon the
bag tube, operating means for the forming plate adapted to cause the said
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plate to oscillate about its rear edge upon the surface of the cylinder during
the rotary movement of said cylinder, the whole operating for the purpose
of opening and forming the bottom of the bag tube, and means to move the
bag tube with the cylinder.’
‘The pith of . . . [the] invention,’ the circuit court said, ‘is the
combination of a rotating cylinder with means for operating the forming
plate in connection therewith, limited, however, to means which cause the
plate to oscillate about its rear edge.’ The court expressed the opinion that
the invention extended to every means by which that result could be
attained, and rejected the contention of the Continental Company, that the
invention was no broader than the details described in the specification. The
court said that it was unable to see upon what the proposition could be
based. And further said that there was nothing in the prior art which either
broadened or narrowed the Liddell invention. ‘If any of . . . [the nineteen
patents which had been put in evidence]’ the court added, ‘pointed out any
form of combining the forming plate with a rotating cylinder, they would,
of course, narrow what Liddell could claim; but they have nothing of that
kind.’ And, speaking of the claims and their limitation by the description, it
was said: ‘Nothing in the manner in which the claims are expressed adopts
as an element the detailed description contained in the specification. So far
as the details of that description are concerned, they come within the
ordinary rule of the preferable method.’…
The discussion thus far brings us to two propositions: That infringement
is not averted merely because the machine alleged to infringe may be
differentiated from the patented machine, even though the invention
embodied in the latter be not primary; and, second, that the description does
not necessarily limit the claims….
It may be well before considering these contentions to refer again to the
view which the circuit court and the circuit court of appeals had of Liddell’s
patent. The circuit court said that the ‘pith’ of the invention ‘is the
combination of a rotating cylinder with means for operating the forming
plate in connection therewith, limited, however, to means which cause the
plate to oscillate about its rear edge on the surface thereof,’ and
distinguished the invention from the prior art, as follows: ‘Aside from the
cylinder and the forming plate oscillating about its rear edge, everything in
these claims [the claims of the patent] is necessarily old in the arts.’ It was
this peculiar feature of novelty, it was said, which clearly distinguished it
from all that went before it. This conclusion was in effect affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals. The latter court said that the folding of the bottoms
of S. O. S. paper bags had been accomplished in the prior art ‘both by a
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folding plate reciprocating upon a plane, and by the operation of fingers
upon a cylinder. The folding plate and the cylinder had never been
combined. The complainant urges with much probability that the reason
why they had not been combined lay in the difficulty of operating a pivoted
folding from upon the surface of a cylinder. Two circles external to each
can be in contact at but one point, while, in order that the folding plate may
operate, its end, as it moves upon a pivot, must remain for some distance in
contact with the surface of the revolving cylinder. The problem may be
solved by causing the pivot or axis of the folding plate to yield away from
the cylinder, or by causing the surface of the cylinder to be depressed away
from the folding plate. The patent in suit adopts the first device, the
defendant’s machine the second, and the crucial question before the court is
this: Under all the circumstances of the case, is the second method, as
compared with the first, within the doctrine of equivalents?’
The court, as we have seen, concluded, from the character of the Liddell
patent, that ‘the second method,’ that is, the method of the Continental
Company’s machine, was ‘within the doctrine of equivalents.’…
The next contention of the petitioner is that a court of equity has no
jurisdiction to restrain the ‘infringement of letters patent the invention
covered by which has long and always and unreasonably been held in
nonuse . . . instead of being made beneficial to the art to which it belongs.’
It will be observed that it is not urged that nonuse merely of the patent takes
jurisdiction from equity, but an unreasonable nonuse…..
Judge Aldrich, in his dissenting opinion in the court of appeals,
excluded the cases as authoritative for a different reason than counsel
expresses. The learned judge said:
‘Simple nonuse is one thing. Standing alone, nonuse is no efficient
reason for withholding injunction. There are many reasons for nonuse
which, upon explanation, are cogent; but when acquiring, holding, and
nonuse are only explainable upon the hypothesis of a purpose to abnormally
force trade into unnatural channels,-a hypothesis involving an attitude
which offends public policy, the conscience of equity, and the very spirit
and intention of the law upon which the legal right is founded,-it is quite
another thing. This is an aspect which has not been considered in a case like
the one here.’
Respondent attacks the conclusion of Judge Aldrich and that of
petitioner, and insists that there is nothing in the record to show that the
nonuse of the patent was either unreasonable or sinister. A very strong
argument is presented by respondent. Its counsel pointedly say that ‘there is

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 7
Oct. 2013

no record evidence at all on the subject or character of complainants’
[respondents’] use or nonuse,’ and points out that neither the assignments of
error on appeal to the circuit court of appeals nor the petition for rehearing
in that court presented the question that the injunction should be denied on
the ground of mere nonuse or unreasonable nonuse. Let us see what the
courts say and what petitioner says. The circuit court says:
‘We have stated that no machine for practical manufacturing purposes
was ever constructed under the Liddell patent. The record also shows that
the complainant, so to speak, locked up its patent. It has never attempted to
make any practical use of it, either itself or through licenses, and,
apparently, its proposed policy has been to avoid this. In this respect it has
not the common excuse of a lack of means, as it is unquestioned that the
complainant is a powerful and wealthy corporation. We have no doubt that
the complainant stands in the common class of manufacturers who
accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting their general
industries and shutting out competitors.’
… But petitioner has given its explanation of the purpose of
respondent. Quoting Judge Aldrich, that the patent in suit has been
‘deliberately held in nonuse for a wrongful purpose,’ petitioner asks, ‘What
was that wrongful purpose? It was the purpose to make more money with
the existing old reciprocating Lorenz & Honiss machines and the existing
old complicated Stilwell machines than could be made with new Liddell
machines, when the cost of building the latter was taken into account. And
this purpose was effective to cause the long and invariable nonuse of the
Liddell invention, notwithstanding that new Liddell machines might have
produced better paper bags than the old Lorenz & Honiss machines or the
old Stilwell machines were producing.’
But, granting all this, it is certainly disputable that the nonuse was
unreasonable, or that the rights of the public were involved. There was no
question of a diminished supply or of increase of prices, and can it be said,
as a matter of law, that a nonuse was unreasonable which had for its motive
the saving of the expense that would have been involved by changing the
equipment of a factory from one set of machines to another? And even if
the old machines could have been altered, the expense would have been
considerable. As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the
use of the new patent, we answer that such exclusion may be said to have
been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of
motive….
The right which a patentee receives does not need much further
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explanation. We have seen that it has been the judgment of Congress from
the beginning that the sciences and the useful arts could be best advanced
by giving an exclusive right to an inventor. The only qualification ever
made was against aliens, in the act of 1832. That act extended the privilege
of the patent law to aliens, but required them ‘to introduce into public use in
the United States the invention or improvement within one year from the
issuing thereof,’ and indulged no intermission of the public use for any
period longer than six months. A violation of the law rendered the patent
void. The act was repealed in 1836. It is manifest, as is said in Walker on
Patents, § 106, that Congress has not ‘overlooked the subject of nonuser of
patented inventions.’ And another fact may be mentioned. In some foreign
countries the right granted to an inventor is affected by nonuse. This policy,
we must assume, Congress has not been ignorant of nor of its effects. It has,
nevertheless, selected another policy; it has continued that policy through
many years. We may assume that experience has demonstrated its wisdom
and beneficial effect upon the arts and sciences.
From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his
remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its
attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but
prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the
patentee. If the conception of the law that a judgment in an action at law is
reparation for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that is the
ground of the action. There may be other trespasses and continuing wrongs
and the vexation of many actions. These are well-recognized grounds of
equity jurisdiction, especially in patent cases, and a citation of cases is
unnecessary. Whether, however, as case cannot arise where, regarding the
situation of the parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity might
be justified in withholding relief by injunction, we do not decide.
Decree affirmed.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. If the doctrine of equivalents should have a broad application to pioneer
patents, as the court suggests, shouldn’t a corollary be that it ought to have a
very narrow application to a narrow patent or, particularly in this case, a
patent that is not even being practiced? On the doctrine of equivalents and
patent scope, see Chapter 1.
2. The Paper Bag Court held that a holder of a valid patent is not obligated
to license its right to a competitor, even if the right is not being used.
Further, whether the patent creates a market monopoly is irrelevant. And
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finally, in this case the patentee did not develop the enforced patent
internally, but acquired it from another for the purpose of taking the
alternative technology out of the market altogether. Is that consistent with
the purpose of the Patent Act?
Congress apparently supported the Paper Bag principle when it
enacted the Patent Misuse Reform Act in 1988. The statute provides:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having … (4) refused to license or use any rights to the
patent…
35 U.S.C. §271 (d)(4). Note that the statute does not distinguish between
used and unused patents, or between internally developed patents and those
acquired from others. Does this provision create an antitrust immunity as
well? Antitrust law does not impose an obligation to use or license
intellectual property either. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 386, 432-33 (1945) (“a patent owner is not in the position of a quasitrustee for the public . . . [it] has no obligation to use it or grant it to
others”).
But see the Kodak decision, infra. See also CHRISTINA
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 11 (2011), which
argues that if a monopolist acquires a patent from an outside source the
acquisition should be limited to a nonexclusive license. That would give
the monopolist the opportunity to keep its technology up to date by
practicing the patent, but it would not permit the monopolist to shut the
technology down by denying access to others.
4, For additional commentary on the Paper Bag case, see Eduwardo M.
Penalver & Oskar Livak, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law
(Cornell Legal Studies Res. P. # 12-62, Oct. 16, 2012, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162667.
WALLACE v. IBM Corp.
467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006)
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Does the provision of copyrighted software under the GNU General
Public License (“GPL”) violate the federal antitrust laws? Authors who
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distribute their works under this license, devised by the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., authorize not only copying but also the creation of
derivative works-and the license prohibits charging for the derivative work.
People may make and distribute derivative works if and only if they come
under the same license terms as the original work. Thus the GPL propagates
from user to user and revision to revision: neither the original author, nor
any creator of a revised or improved version, may charge for the software or
allow any successor to charge
One prominent example of free, open-source software is the Linux
operating system, a derivative of the Unix operating system written by
AT&T in the 1960s and now available without cost. (UNIX® is a trademark
of The Open Group, but the source code to many variants of AT & T’s
work is freely available.) Linux is one of many modern derivatives of Unixwhich is not itself under the GPL. Thus Apple Computer, which uses the
Berkeley Software Distribution variant of Unix as the foundation for the
Mac OS X operating system, is entitled to charge for its software. Linux,
initially the work of Linus Torvalds, is maintained by a large open-source
community. International Business Machines offers Linux with many of its
servers, or customers can install it themselves. IBM has contributed code to
the Linux project and furnishes this derivative work to anyone else with an
interest. Red Hat, Inc., sells media (such as DVDs), manuals, and support
for the installation and maintenance of Linux. The GPL covers only the
software; people are free to charge for the physical media on which it comes
and for assistance in making it work. Paper manuals, and the time of
knowledgeable people who service and support an installation, thus are the
most expensive part of using Linux.
Daniel Wallace would like to compete with Linux-either by offering a
derivative work or by writing an operating system from scratch-but
maintains that this is impossible as long as Linux and its derivatives are
available for free. He contends that IBM, Red Hat, and Novell have
conspired among themselves and with others (including the Free Software
Foundation) to eliminate competition in the operating system market by
making Linux available at an unbeatable price. Under the GPL, which
passes from user to improver to user, Linux and all software that
incorporates any of its source code will be free forever, and nothing could
be a more effective deterrent to competition, Wallace maintains. …
Although antitrust law serves the interests of consumers rather than
producers, the Supreme Court has permitted producers to initiate predatorypricing litigation. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
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Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). This does not assist Wallace, however,
because his legal theory is faulty substantively.
Predatory pricing is a three-stage process: Low prices, followed by the
exit of producers who can no longer make a profit, followed by monopoly
prices. The law’s worry is the final period in which the survivor (or cartel of
survivors) recoups losses incurred during the low-price period. When exit
does not occur, or recoupment is improbable even if some producers give
up the market, there is no antitrust problem. So the Court held in both
Brooke Group and Matsushita. … Either prices will stay low (reflecting
efficient production and enduring benefits to consumers) or the practice will
be self-deterring (because the predator loses more during the low-price
period than it gains later, and consumers are net beneficiaries). When
monopoly does not ensue, low prices remain-and the goal of antitrust law is
to use rivalry to keep prices low for consumers’ benefit. Employing
antitrust law to drive prices up would turn the Sherman Act on its head.
Wallace does not contend that software available for free under the GPL
will lead to monopoly prices in the future. How could it, when the GPL
keeps price low forever and precludes the reduction of output that is
essential to monopoly? …
Software that is not maintained and improved eventually becomes
obsolete, and the lack of reward may reduce the resources devoted to
maintenance and improvement of Linux and other open-source projects. If
that occurs, however, then proprietary software will enter or gain market
share. People willingly pay for quality software even when they can get free
(but imperfect) substitutes. Open Office is a free, open-source suite of word
processor, spreadsheet and presentation software, but the proprietary
Microsoft Office has many more users. Gimp is a free, open-source image
editor, but the proprietary Adobe Photoshop enjoys the lion’s share of the
market. Likewise there is a flourishing market in legal treatises and other
materials, plus reference databases such as LEXIS and Westlaw, even
though courts give away their work (this opinion, for example, is not
covered by copyright and may be downloaded from the court’s web site and
copied without charge). And so it is with operating systems. Many more
people use Microsoft Windows, Apple OS X, or Sun Solaris than use Linux.
IBM, which includes Linux with servers, sells mainframes and
supercomputers that run proprietary operating systems. The number of
proprietary operating systems is growing, not shrinking, so competition in
this market continues quite apart from the fact that the GPL ensures the
future availability of Linux and other Unix offshoots.
It does not help to characterize people who accept the GPL as
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“conspirators.” Although the antitrust laws forbid conspiracies “in restraint
of trade,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, § 26, the GPL does not restrain trade. It is a
cooperative agreement that facilitates production of new derivative works,
and agreements that yield new products that would not arise through
unilateral action are lawful.
Nor does it help to call the GPL “price fixing.” Although it sets a price
of zero, agreements to set maximum prices usually assist consumers and
therefore are evaluated under the Rule of Reason. See State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997). Intellectual property can be used without being used up;
the marginal cost of an additional user is zero (costs of media and paper to
one side), so once a piece of intellectual property exists the efficient price of
an extra copy is zero, for that is where price equals marginal cost. Copyright
and patent laws give authors a right to charge more, so that they can recover
their fixed costs (and thus promote innovation), but they do not require
authors to charge more. No more does antitrust law require higher prices.
Linux and other open-source projects have been able to cover their fixed
costs through donations of time; as long as that remains true, it would
reduce efficiency and consumers’ welfare to force the authors to levy a
charge on each new user.
Wallace does not contend that Linux has such a large market share, or
poses such a threat to consumers’ welfare in the long run, that evaluation
under the Rule of Reason could lead to condemnation. A “quick look” is all
that’s needed to reject Wallace’s claim. See, e.g., California Dental
Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Ball Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.
1986) (unless a firm with market power can increase its profits by curtailing
output, the practice is lawful under the Rule of Reason). The GPL and opensource software have nothing to fear from the antitrust laws.
AFFIRMED.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. How can a software company make a profit when it offers a product for
free? Software is typically expensive to develop but very inexpensive to
distribute once it has been developed.
A great deal of free software, such as that in Wallace, is sold in “twosided” markets in which the seller earns its revenue from a different product
that is bundled with the software. That was the point missed in his
complaint: IBM was not “giving away” software: it was providing the open
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source software at no additional charge to users of its computer systems.
See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Chs. 11 &
12 (2011).
The business model adopted by free software is based on a product that
offers a very low price, a large installed base, and adaptability. A customer
of free software is able to modify and adapt the software to its individual
needs. Additionally, a business also assumes that by offering the software
for free, it will be able to increase the sales of complementary products and
services that it already charges its customers.
For example, Symbian and Android are operating systems for
cellphones that are bundled with the phones themselves. Symbian was
developed for more traditional phones, although its features have expanded
over time. Android, which was developed by Google, is used in
“smartphones.” The software license allows each manufacturer to design a
mobile phone device of its choosing. Additionally, the manufacturers are
able to update the devices with new features or applications.
2. The law of predatory pricing generally requires a plaintiff to show that a
price is “below cost” and that the predatory could reasonably anticipate that
its investment in below cost pricing would be followed by a “recoupment”
period after the rival has been excluded. Further, this anticipated
recoupment must be sufficiently large to pay off the investment in predation
after being discounted for the time value of money and the likelihood that
the scheme will fail. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. RossSimmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (predatory
buying). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 8.2-8.7 (4th ed. 2011). As
Judge Easterbrook observes, there can be no post-predation “recoupment” if
the price of the product can never rise above zero; nothing will ever be
recouped.
What about the price, however? Was it “below cost,” given that IBM
was not simply giving away software. Rather it was bundling the software
with a computer hardware system? It was additionally required by the
license agreement to make its variation of the software available to others.
How does one measure the “price” of the software in these circumstances?

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 14
Oct. 2013

What if IBM’s overall profits from making computers and open source
software to run them were positive?
2. Some patent licensing agreements contain provisions known as
“grantbacks.” This provision stipulates that the licensee is required to
convey back to the licensor the right to use those improvements. Could this
provision produce an anticompetitve effect? According to the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission, which have issued antitrust
Guidelines for intellectual property licensing, grantbacks can be
anticompetitive “if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to
engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation
markets.” Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property §
5.6 (1995).1 But grantbacks can be competitively harmless if they are
nonexclusive. See Binks Mfg. c. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d
252, 259 (7th Cir. 1960). Courts evaluate grantbacks under antitrust’s rule
of reason, which requires proof of market power and competitive harm. See
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 64648 (1947). The Antitrust-IP Guidelines provide that factors considered in
the rule of reason analysis are “the likely effects [of grantbacks] in light of
the overall structure of the licensing arrangement and conditions in the
relevant markets.” Id. at §5.6. Other factors include: (1) relevant market
power and relevant market’s competition in the technology, (2) scope and
duration of the grantbacks, (3) whether the grantback is royalty free and
whether improvements are sublicensed free, and (4) the extent to which an
pooling arranging in conjuction with grantbacks impede competition and
innovation.
IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC. v. EASTMAN
KODAK CO.
125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998)
BEEZER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellees Image Technical Services, and ten other
independent service organizations (“ISOs”) that service Kodak photocopiers
and micrographic equipment sued the Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak”) for
violations of the Sherman Act. The ISOs alleged that Kodak used its
monopoly in the market for Kodak photocopier and micrographic parts to
create a second monopoly in the equipment service markets. A jury verdict
awarded treble damages totaling $71.8 million….
1

Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
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This appeal raises questions relating to the application of antitrust
principles upon a finding that a monopolist unilaterally refused to deal with
competitors. We also address overlapping patent and copyright issues and
their significance in the antitrust context.
Kodak manufactures, sells and services high volume photocopiers and
micrographic (or microfilm) equipment. Competition in these markets is
strong. In the photocopier market Kodak’s competitors include Xerox, IBM
and Canon. Kodak’s competitors in the micrographics market include
Minolta, Bell & Howell and 3M. Despite comparable products in these
markets, Kodak’s equipment is distinctive. Although Kodak equipment may
perform similar functions to that of its competitors, Kodak’s parts are not
interchangeable with parts used in other manufacturers’ equipment.
Kodak sells and installs replacement parts for its equipment. Kodak
competes with ISOs in these markets. Kodak has ready access to all parts
necessary for repair services because it manufactures many of the parts used
in its equipment and purchases the remaining necessary parts from
independent original-equipment manufacturers. In the service market,
Kodak repairs at least 80% of the machines it manufactures. ISOs began
servicing Kodak equipment in the early 1980’s, and have provided cheaper
and better service at times, according to some customers. ISOs obtain parts
for repair service from a variety of sources, including, at one time, Kodak.
As ISOs grew more competitive, Kodak began restricting access to its
photocopier and micrographic parts. In 1985, Kodak stopped selling copier
parts to ISOs, and in 1986, Kodak halted sales of micrographic parts to
ISOs. Additionally, Kodak secured agreements from their contracted
original-equipment manufacturers not to sell parts to ISOs. These parts
restrictions limited the ISOs’ ability to compete in the service market for
Kodak machines. Competition in the service market requires that service
providers have ready access to all parts.
Kodak offers annual or multi-year service contracts to its customers.
Service providers generally contract with equipment owners through multiyear service contracts. ISOs claim that they were unable to provide similar
contracts because they lack a reliable supply of parts. Some ISOs contend
that the parts shortage forced them out of business.
In 1987, the ISOs filed this action against Kodak, seeking damages and
injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman Act. The ISOs claimed that
Kodak both: (1) unlawfully tied the sale of service for Kodak machines with
the sale of parts in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and (2)
monopolized or attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak
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machines in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
… Before closing arguments, the ISOs withdrew their § 1 tying and
conspiracy claims. The remaining § 2 attempted monopolization and
monopolization claims were submitted to the jury. A unanimous verdict
awarded damages to the ISO’s totaling $71.8 million after trebling….
After accepting the verdict, the district court crafted a ten year
injunction requiring Kodak to sell all parts to ISOs on “reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms and prices.” The injunction required Kodak to sell:
(1) all parts for Kodak equipment; (2) all parts described in Kodak’s Parts
Lists; (3) all parts of supply items that are field replaceable by Kodak
technicians; (4) all service manuals and price lists; and (5) all tools or
devices “essential to servicing Kodak equipment.”
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies, attempts to form
monopolies, as well as combinations and conspiracies to do so. 15 U.S.C. §
2. The ISOs presented evidence in support of two § 2 theories: attempted
monopolization and monopolization. They alleged, and the jury concluded,
that Kodak used its monopoly over Kodak photocopier and micrographic
parts to attempt to create and actually create a second monopoly over the
service markets.
To prevail on a § 2 attempt claim, the ISOs were required to establish:
“(1) a specific intent to control prices or destroy competition; (2) predatory
or anticompetitive conduct directed at accomplishing that purpose; (3) a
dangerous probability of achieving ‘monopoly power,’ and (4) causal
antitrust injury.” … The requirements of a § 2 monopolization claim are
similar, differing primarily in the requisite intent and the necessary level of
monopoly power. …
To demonstrate market power by circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff
must: “(1) define the relevant market, (2) show that the defendant owns a
dominant share of that market, and (3) show that there are significant
barriers to entry and show that existing competitors lack the capacity to
increase their output in the short run.”
We begin with the relevant market determination. The relevant market
is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist…..
[Kodak] argues that because no two parts are interchangeable, the
relevant markets for parts consist of the market for each individual part for
Kodak photocopiers and each single part for Kodak micrographics
equipment. Under Kodak’s theory there are not two relevant parts markets,
but thousands of individual “part” markets. Kodak contends that the ISOs
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should have been required to demonstrate that they could not obtain
particular nonpatented parts and that the failure to obtain that particular part
resulted in a Kodak monopoly over service. We reject Kodak’s market
definition.
Kodak’s market definition focuses exclusively on the interchangeability
of the parts although ignoring the “commercial realities” faced by ISOs and
end users. …
The “commercial reality” faced by service providers and equipment
owners is that a service provider must have ready access to all parts to
compete in the service market. As the relevant market for service “from the
Kodak equipment owner’s perspective is composed of only those
companies that service Kodak machines,” id., the relevant market for parts
from the equipment owners’ and service providers’ perspective is composed
of “all parts” that are designed to meet Kodak photocopier and
micrographics equipment specifications. The makers of these parts “if
unified by a monopolist or a hypothetical cartel, would have market power
in dealing with” ISOs and end users. Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436 (quoting
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 518.1b, at 534 (Supp.1993))
(defining relevant “market”)….
…. The second element of a § 2 monopoly claim, the “conduct”
element, is the use of monopoly power “to foreclose competition, to gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.” …
Kodak’s chief complaint with the monopoly power jury instructions lies
with Jury Instruction No. 29. That Instruction, entitled “MonopolizationMonopoly Conduct,” states in relevant part:
[a] company with monopoly power in a relevant market has no general
duty to cooperate with its business rivals and may refuse to deal with
them or with their customers if valid business reasons exist for such
refusal. It is unlawful, however, for a monopolist to engage in conduct,
including refusals to deal, that unnecessarily excludes or handicaps
competitors in order to maintain a monopoly.
(emphasis added). Kodak argues that this instruction lacks objective
standards and improperly includes within the prohibited activities a lawful
monopolist’s “aggressive” competition.
Specifically, Kodak challenges Instruction No. 29’s “unnecessarily
excludes or handicaps competitors” language. Kodak says that this language
is based on a form of “monopoly leveraging” that we previously rejected in
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 543 (9th
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Cir.1991). In Alaska Airlines we did reject the Second Circuit’s holding in
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979).
Berkey Photo recognized liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act on a theory
of monopoly leveraging involving a firm which used “its monopoly power
in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another, albeit without an
attempt to monopolize the second market.” 603 F.2d at 275. In Alaska
Airlines, we held that “monopoly leveraging” could not exist as a basis for §
2 liability in the absence of the defendant using its monopoly in one market
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the downstream market. 948 F.2d
at 547. We characterized Berkey Photo ‘s downstream monopoly
requirement “to gain a competitive advantage” as too “loose.” Alaska
Airlines, 948 F.2d at 546.
Kodak accuses the district court of incorporating Berkey Photo’s
repudiated language into the court’s instructions. We disagree. Instruction
No. 29 required the jury to find that Kodak’s monopoly conduct be
undertaken “in order to maintain a monopoly” in the downstream market.
Berkey Photo ‘s watered-down standard does not go this far. Instruction No.
29 makes clear that the monopolies at issue are Kodak’s alleged service
monopolies and the Instruction required the jury to find that Kodak acted in
furtherance of maintaining its service monopolies. Instruction No. 29’s
“unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors” language does not come
from Berkey Photo, but from the jury instruction endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
597 (1985)….
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits a monopolist’s unilateral action,
like Kodak’s refusal to deal, if that conduct harms the competitive process
in the absence of a legitimate business justification….
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Aspen Skiing with a discussion
of the “right to refuse to deal,” a right the Court characterized as highly
valued but not “unqualified.” Id. at 601. The Court, quoting extensively
from Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951), held
that the right to refuse to deal was “neither absolute nor exempt from
regulation” and when used “as a purposeful means of monopolizing
interstate commerce” the exercise of that right violates the Sherman Act.
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602. Thus “the long recognized right ... [to] freely
[ ] exercise [one’s] own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal” does not violate the Sherman Act “[i]n the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.” Id. (quoting Lorain Journal,
342 U.S. at 155) (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted). In Aspen
Skiing, the Court noted that a defendant’s refusal to deal was evidence of
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its’ intent “relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly
characterized as ‘exclusionary’ or ‘anticompetitive’-to use the words in the
trial court’s instructions-or ‘predatory,’ to use a word that scholars seem to
favor.”
Next, the Court reasoned that a monopolist’s refusal to deal was not
limited to the specific facts of Lorain Journal, but also covered the Aspen
Skiing defendant-monopolist’s election “to make an important change in a
pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had
persisted for several years.”….
Jury Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 here covered the requirements set
forth in Aspen Skiing. Like the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing, we are
faced with a situation in which a monopolist made a conscious choice to
change an established pattern of distribution to the detriment of competitors.
Id. at 603. Although the service market prior to Kodak’s parts policy had
not “originated in a competitive market and persisted for several years,” id.,
the ISO service market had existed for three years and was growing rapidly
before Kodak implemented its parts policy. Our case is factually
distinguishable from Aspen Skiing in several respects: here there are no
readily comparable competitive markets; ISO profits were not halved after
the imposition of the anticompetitive policies; and there are two markets at
issue, rather than only one. Further, unlike most essential facilities cases
and this case, Aspen Skiing did not involve the effects of a supplier’s refusal
to deal with its customers in order to control a downstream market…. [W]e
believe the Supreme Court, in Aspen Skiing, endorsed a more general
application of § 2 principles to refusal to deal cases. See Data General, 36
F.3d at 1183-84 (plaintiff alleging § 2 refusal to deal claim “need not tailor
its argument to a preexisting ‘category’ of unilateral refusals to deal.”). The
district court’s Jury Instruction No. 29 was proper…..
Our conclusion that the ISOs have shown that Kodak has both attained
monopoly power and exercised exclusionary conduct does not end our
inquiry. Kodak’s conduct may not be actionable if supported by a legitimate
business justification. When a legitimate business justification supports a
monopolist’s exclusionary conduct, that conduct does not violate § 2 of the
Sherman Act. A plaintiff may rebut an asserted business justification by
demonstrating either that the justification does not legitimately promote
competition or that the justification is pretextual. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at
483-84 (citing Kodak, 903 F.2d at 618). Kodak asserts that the protection of
its patented and copyrighted parts is a valid business justification for its
anticompetitive conduct and argues that the district court’s erroneous jury
instructions made it impossible for the jury to properly consider this
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justification….
The ISOs’ evidence suffices to support the jury’s rejection of Kodak’s
business justifications, as the record reflects evidence of pretext. The ISOs
presented evidence that: (1) Kodak adopted its parts policy only after an
ISO won a contract with the State of California; (2) Kodak allowed its own
customers to service their machines; (3) Kodak customers could distinguish
breakdowns due to poor service from breakdowns due to parts; and (4)
many customers preferred ISO service.Kodak also attacks the district
court’s business justifications instructions for their failure to properly detail
Kodak’s intellectual property rights. Kodak argues that the court failed to
instruct the jury that Kodak’s numerous patents and copyrights provide a
legitimate business justification for Kodak’s alleged exclusionary conduct.
Kodak holds 220 valid United States patents covering 65 parts for its high
volume photocopiers and micrographics equipment, and all Kodak
diagnostic software and service software are copyrighted. The jury
instructions do not afford Kodak any “rights” or “privileges” based on its
patents and copyrights: all parts are treated the same. In Jury Instruction No.
37, the court told the jury:
[i]f you find that Kodak engaged in monopolization or attempted
monopolization by misuse of its alleged parts monopoly ... then the fact
that some of the replacement parts are patented or copyrighted does not
provide Kodak with a defense against any of those antitrust claims.
In Jury Instruction No. 28, the court stated, over Kodak’s objection, that:
[s]uch [exclusionary] conduct does not refer to ordinary means of
competition, like offering better products or services, exercising
superior skill or business judgment, utilizing more efficient technology,
or exercising natural competitive advantages.
Kodak proposed to include “exercising lawful patents and copyrights”
amongst the list of non-exclusionary conduct in Instruction No. 28, but the
district court rejected that language.
Kodak’s challenge raises unresolved questions concerning the
relationship between federal antitrust, copyright and patent laws. In
particular we must determine the significance of a monopolist’s unilateral
refusal to sell or license a patented or copyrighted product in the context of
a § 2 monopolization claim based upon monopoly leveraging. This is a
question of first impression.
We first identify the general principles of antitrust, copyright and patent
law as we must ultimately harmonize these statutory schemes in responding
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to Kodak’s challenge.
Antitrust law seeks to promote and protect a competitive marketplace
for the benefit of the public. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 58 (1911); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2nd Cir.
1981). The Sherman Act, the relevant antitrust law here, prohibits efforts
both to restrain trade by combination or conspiracy and the acquisition or
maintenance of a monopoly by exclusionary conduct. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
Patent law seeks to protect inventions, while inducing their introduction
into the market for public benefit. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203. Patent
laws “reward the inventor with the power to exclude others from making,
using or selling [a patented] invention throughout the United States.” Id.
Meanwhile, the public benefits both from the faster introduction of
inventions, and the resulting increase in market competition. Legally, a
patent amounts to a permissible monopoly over the protected work. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
Patent laws “are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them pro
tanto (as far as the patent laws go).” Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13,
24 (1964).
Federal copyright law “secure[s] a fair return for an author’s creative
labor” in the short run, while ultimately seeking “to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). The
Copyright Act grants to the copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute
the protected work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. This right encompasses the right to
“refrain from vending or licensing,” as the owner may “content [itself] with
simply exercising the right to exclude others from using [its] property.”
Data General, 36 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 127 (1932)); see Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29
(1990)(“nothing in the copyright statutes would prevent an author from
hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright.”)
Clearly the antitrust, copyright and patent laws both overlap and, in
certain situations, seem to conflict. This is not a new revelation. We have
previously noted the “obvious tension” between the patent and antitrust
laws: “[o]ne body of law creates and protects monopoly power while the
other seeks to proscribe it.” United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). Similarly, tension
exists between the antitrust and copyright laws. See Data General, 36 F.3d
at 1187.
Two principles have emerged regarding the interplay between these

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 22
Oct. 2013

laws: (1) neither patent nor copyright holders are immune from antitrust
liability, and (2) patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell or license
protected work. First, as to antitrust liability, case law supports the
proposition that a holder of a patent or copyright violates the antitrust laws
by “concerted and contractual behavior that threatens competition.”…
Case law also supports the right of a patent or copyright holder to refuse
to sell or license protected work. …. We find no reported case in which a
court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license
a patent or copyright. Courts do not generally view a monopolist’s
unilateral refusal to license a patent as “exclusionary conduct.” See Data
General, 36 F.3d at 1186 (citing Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of
North America, 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987)) (“A patent holder who
lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by
refusing to license the patent to others.”)…..
This basic right of exclusion does have limits. For example, a patent
offers no protection if it was unlawfully acquired. Data General, 36 F.3d at
1186 (citing SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1208-09). Nor does the right of
exclusion protect an attempt to extend a lawful monopoly beyond the grant
of a patent. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
condemns exclusionary conduct that extends natural monopolies into
separate markets. Much depends, therefore, on the definition of the patent
grant and the relevant market.
The relevant market for determining the patent or copyright grant is
determined under patent or copyright law. See, e.g., id. at 666 (the patent’s
grant “is limited to the invention which it defines.”). The relevant markets
for antitrust purposes are determined by examining economic conditions. …
Parts and service here have been proven separate markets in the antitrust
context, but this does not resolve the question whether the service market
falls “reasonably within the patent [or copyright] grant” for the purpose of
determining the extent of the exclusive rights conveyed….
… [W]e adopt a modified version of the rebuttable presumption created
by the First Circuit in Data General, and hold that “while exclusionary
conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a [patent or]
copyright,” or to sell its patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist’s
“desire to exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.” Data General,
36 F.3d at 1187.
… Given the interplay of the antitrust and intellectual property laws
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discussed above, Kodak’s contention that its refusal to sell its parts to ISOs
was based on its reluctance to sell its patented or copyrighted parts was a
presumptively legitimate business justification. See Data General, 36 F.3d.
at 1187. Kodak may assert that its desire to profit from its intellectual
property rights justifies its conduct, and the jury should presume that this
justification is legitimately procompetitive.
Nonetheless, this presumption is rebuttable…. The Data General court
noted that the presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted by evidence that
the monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual property laws in
an unlawful manner. See 36 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). The
presumption may also be rebutted by evidence of pretext. Neither the aims
of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask
anticompetitive conduct….
Kodak photocopy and micrographics equipment requires thousands of
parts, of which only 65 were patented. Unlike the other cases involving
refusals to license patents, this case concerns a blanket refusal that included
protected and unprotected products…. From this evidence, it is more
probable than not that the jury would have found Kodak’s presumptively
valid business justification rebutted on the grounds of pretext.
Kodak argues that the existence of some patented and copyrighted
products undermines ISOs “all parts” theory. To the contrary, as discussed
above, the “all parts” market reflects the “commercial realities” of the
marketplace and the lack of identifiable separate markets for individual
parts. The fact that Kodak did not differentiate between patented and
nonpatented parts lends further support to the existence of these commercial
realities. The jury accepted the “all parts” theory and found a scheme to
monopolize the service market through Kodak’s conduct. We hold that the
district court’s failure to instruct on Kodak’s intellectual property rights was
harmless.
Last, Kodak challenges the district court’s ten-year permanent
injunction requiring Kodak to sell all parts to all ISOs at reasonable
prices….
[T]he injunction requires Kodak to sell all parts for Kodak equipment,
whether or not Kodak manufactures those parts, and forbids Kodak from
interfering with sales to ISOs by original-equipment manufacturers.
Through these two provisions, the injunction allows the ISOs to choose
between purchasing from Kodak, which must warehouse parts, or from
individual suppliers. Because the ISOs have an alternative source for these
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parts, the “no interference with [original-equipment manufacturers]”
requirement is unnecessary and anticompetitive. It promotes free-riding by
requiring Kodak to pay for keeping a massive inventory of parts for the
ISOs…..
Next, Kodak contends that the injunction imposes utility-like regulation
of prices and deprives Kodak of its right to earn monopoly profits on its
patented and copyrighted products. This requirement involves the court in a
matter generally considered beyond our function, namely, direct price
administration.
….
Dropping the reasonableness element and requiring
nondiscriminatory pricing will both end Kodak’s service monopoly and
protect Kodak’s intellectual property rights. Kodak should be permitted to
charge all of its customers, including end users (both self-servicers and
those under service contracts with Kodak), service companies contracting
with Kodak and ISOs, any nondiscriminatory price that the market will
bear. We direct the district court to modify the injunction by deleting the
requirement that prices “in any event, be reasonable.”….
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Kodak opinion was on remand from the Supreme
Court’s important and controversial decision five years earlier in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Svces., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The Supreme
Court held that although Kodak controlled only some 23% of the market for
high speed photocopiers there could nevertheless be a relevant market for
“Kodak” parts and service. The Court reasoned that once Kodak’s
customers had purchased their unit they were “locked in” and faced high
“switching costs,” thus permitting them to be charged a monopoly price.
As a result a relevant market limited to a single brand could be appropriate.
Since a firm controls 100% of its own brand this could entail monopoly.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.3a (4th Cir. 2011). As the discussion
there notes, while Kodak has never been overruled its recognition of singlebrand markets by nondominant firms has proven to be very controversial
and courts often bend over backwards to avoid it.
2. Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak decision, the Federal Circuit
also confronted the issue of a patent owner’s refusal to license its patent
rights to others. In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust
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Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Xerox”). The Federal Circuit
rejected the claim brought by an independent service organization ("ISO")
that Xerox's refusal to sell patented replacement parts and copyrighted
service manuals for its copiers violated the antitrust laws:
[The plaintiff] relies on the Ninth Circuit’s holding … in Image
Technical Services [``Kodak”] that ```while exclusionary conduct
can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a [patent] or
to sell its patented ... work, a monopolist’s `desire to exclude others
from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers. 125 F.3d at 1218
(citing Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147, 1187 (1st Cir.1994)). By that case, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
rebuttable presumption that the exercise of the statutory right to
exclude provides a valid business justification for consumer harm,
but then excused as harmless the district court’s error in failing to
give any instruction on the effect of intellectual property rights on
the application of the antitrust laws. It concluded that the jury must
have rejected the presumptively valid business justification as
pretextual. This logic requires an evaluation of the patentee’s
subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented
products for pretext. We decline to follow Image Technical Services.
We have held that if a [patent infringement] suit is not
objectively baseless, an antitrust defendant’s subjective motivation
is immaterial. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072. We see no more
reason to inquire into the subjective motivation of Xerox in refusing
to sell or license its patented works than we found in evaluating the
subjective motivation of a patentee in bringing suit To enforce that
same right. In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent
holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability
under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire into his
subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though
his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant. It is the
infringement defendant and not the patentee that bears the burden to
show that one of these exceptional situations exists and, in the
absence of such proof, we will not inquire into the patentee’s

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 26
Oct. 2013

motivations for asserting his statutory right to exclude….
The court further held that a patent owner’s subjective motivation for
refusing to license its patents is irrelevant, except in three narrow instances:
(1) where the patent owner procures the patent by fraud on the Patent and
Trademark Office, (2) where the patent owner engages in "sham" patent
litigation (that is, sues to enforce a patent knowing that the patent is invalid,
or (3) where the patent owner engages in unlawful "tying.” Id. at 1326-27.
Rather, the court must determine whether the patent holder was acting
"within the scope of the statutory patent grant" regardless of whether those
actions fall in multiplex antitrust markets.
3. Suppose Alpha patents a device or technology that works exclusively
with Beta's patented technology. That may place the firms in a bilateral
monopoly relationship. But should that give Beta an antitrust duty to deal
with Alpha? In Eatoni Ergonomics, Inc. v. Research in Motion Corp., 2012
WL 2348443 (2d Cir. June 21, 2012), the Second Circuit held that Research
in Motion (RIM), the maker of the Blackberry smartphone, did not act
unlawfully when it refused to incorporate the plaintiff's patented "reduced
QWERTY" keyboard technology into its devices. The parties had initially
agreed to engage in joint development that might result in incorporation of
Eatoni's technology, but RIM abandoned the efforts after making "a
legitimate business judgment that the parties' proposed reduce QWERTY
model was not viable." The court observed:
To the extent Eatoni argues that RIM's mobile phones offer the only
platform compatible with its patented reduced QWERTY keyboard
technology, we agree with the district court that § 2 does not obligate
RIM to share its patented platform technology, from which RIM derives
the lawful power to exclude others' use. Further, Eatoni's contention is
belied by the amended complaint, which states that Eatoni has
successfully applied its patent to a mobile phone platform other than
RIM's.
MICROSOFT CORP. V COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
(Case T-201/04 European Court of First Instance , Sep. 2007)
[Microsoft was charged with abuse of a dominant position under
European Competition law (Article 82, now Article 102 of the Treaty on the
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Functioning of the European Union). It allegedly failed to provide the
operators of email or internet servers who used non-Microsoft operating
systems satisfactory interconnection protocols, or instructions so that they
could be fully compatible with networks that ran the Microsoft Windows
operating system. Microsoft had also developed a proprietary Microsoft
server operating system in competition with these rivals. – ed.]
Summary of the Judgment
Article 82 EC deals with the conduct of one or more economic operators
involving the abuse of a position of economic strength which enables the
operator concerned to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on
the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers.
Furthermore, whilst the finding of a dominant position does not in itself
imply any criticism of the undertaking concerned, that undertaking has a
special responsibility, irrespective of the causes of that position, not to
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common
market....
4
In proceedings brought on the basis of Article 82 EC, the
Commission may define the concept of ‘interoperability’ as the capacity for
two software products to exchange information and to use that information
mutually in order to allow each of those software products to function in all
the ways envisaged, without being bound by the definition given by
Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs, from which
it does not depart.
In that context, the Commission may determine the ‘degree of
interoperability’ of software products by reference to what, in its view, is
necessary, in the light of Article 82 EC, in order to enable developers of
work group server operating systems competing with the dominant
developer to remain viably on the market. Should it be established that the
existing degree of interoperability does not enable those developers to
remain viably on the market, it follows that the maintenance of effective
competition on that market is being hindered.
In requiring, by way of remedy, that an undertaking in a dominant
position disclose the interoperability information, the Commission refers to
a detailed technical description of certain rules of interconnection and
interaction that can be used within the work group networks to deliver work
group services. That description does not extend to the way in which the
undertaking implements those rules, in particular, to the internal structure or
to the source code of its products.
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The degree of interoperability thus required by the Commission enables
competing operating systems to interoperate with the dominant
undertaking’s domain architecture on an equal footing in order to be able to
compete viably with the latter’s operating systems. It does not entail making
competitors’ products work in exactly the same way as its own and does not
enable its competitors to clone or reproduce its products or certain features
of those products.
5
In a decision penalising the refusal by a dominant undertaking to
provide competing undertakings with interoperability information of
software products, the Commission may refrain from making a finding on
the issue whether the dominant undertaking’s communication protocols or
the specifications of those protocols are covered by intellectual property
rights and assume that the undertaking is able to rely on such rights. Thus
the Commission may proceed on the premise that the refusal to supply
interoperability information might not be a mere refusal to supply a product
or a service indispensable to the exercise of a specific activity but a refusal
to license intellectual property rights. The Commission thus chooses the
strictest legal test and therefore the one most favourable to the accused
dominant undertaking. In such a situation, it is therefore necessary to
ascertain whether the criteria which determine when an undertaking in a
dominant position can be required to grant a licence relating to intellectual
property rights are satisfied.
6
Although undertakings are, as a rule, free to choose their business
partners, in certain circumstances a refusal to supply on the part of a
dominant undertaking may constitute an abuse of a dominant position
within the meaning of Article 82 EC unless it is objectively justified.
The refusal by an undertaking holding a dominant position to license a
third party to use a product covered by an intellectual property right cannot
in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of
Article 82 EC.
It is only in exceptional circumstances that the exercise of the exclusive
right by the owner of the intellectual property right may give rise to such an
abuse and that, accordingly, it is permissible, in the public interest in
maintaining effective competition on the market, to encroach upon the
exclusive right of the holder of the intellectual property right by requiring
him to grant licences to third parties seeking to enter or remain on that
market.
The following circumstances, in particular, must be considered to be
exceptional: in the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service
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indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a neighbouring
market; in the second place, the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any
effective competition on that neighbouring market; in the third place, the
refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is potential
consumer demand.
Once it is established that such circumstances are present, the refusal by
the holder of a dominant position to grant a licence may infringe Article 82
EC unless the refusal is objectively justified.
Finally, in order that a refusal to give access to a product or service
indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity may be considered
abusive, it is necessary to distinguish two markets, namely, a market
constituted by that product or service and on which the undertaking refusing
to supply holds a dominant position and a neighbouring market on which
the product or service is used in the manufacture of another product or for
the supply of another service. The fact that the indispensable product or
service is not marketed separately does not exclude from the outset the
possibility of identifying a separate market. It is sufficient that a potential
market or even a hypothetical market can be identified. Such is the case
where the products or services are indispensable to the conduct of a
particular business activity and where there is an actual demand for them on
the part of undertakings which seek to carry on that business. It is decisive
that two different stages of production are identified and that they are
interconnected in that the upstream product is indispensable for supply of
the downstream product.
7
For the purposes of application of Article 82 EC to the refusal of a
dominant undertaking to grant a licence in the market for work group server
operating systems, the ‘interoperability information’ must be regarded as
being ‘indispensable’, inter alia because the interoperability is of significant
competitive importance in that market, even if their lack of availability
leads to competition being eliminated only gradually and not immediately.
8 As stated in the Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant
market for the purposes of Community competition law, ‘[a] relevant
product market comprises all those products and/or services which are
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of
the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use’. Supplyside substitutability may also be taken into account when defining markets
in those situations in which its effects are equivalent to those of demand
substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy. That means that
suppliers are able to switch production to the relevant products and market
them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks
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in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices.
With respect to operating systems, the Commission may correctly find
that there is a market for work group server operating systems which is
separate from the market for client PC operating systems.....
12 Although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances
that constitute an infringement of Article 82 EC is borne by the
Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the
Commission, before the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any
plea of objective justification and to support it with arguments and
evidence. It then falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a
finding of an abuse of a dominant position, to show that the arguments and
evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, accordingly, that
the justification put forward cannot be accepted.
The mere fact that a product is covered by intellectual property rights
cannot constitute objective justification to refuse to grant a licence. If the
mere fact of holding intellectual property rights could in itself constitute
objective justification for such a refusal, the exception established by the
case-law could never apply.....
15
In order to determine whether the conduct of the dominant
undertaking constitutes abusive tying, the Commission is entitled to base its
finding on the following factors: first, the tying and tied products are two
separate products; second, the undertaking concerned is dominant in the
market for the tying product; third, the undertaking concerned does not give
customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product; and
fourth, the practice in question forecloses competition. The Commission
also takes into account the fact that the tying is not objectively justified.
1. The contested decision....
I – Relevant product markets and geographic market
24
The first market defined in the contested decision is the market
for client PC operating systems. Operating systems are defined as ‘system
software’ which controls the basic functions of the computer and enables
the user to make use of the computer and run application software on it
(recital 37 to the contested decision). Client PCs are defined as generalpurpose computers designed for use by one person at a time and capable of
being connected to a network (recital 45 to the contested decision).
25

As regards the second market, the contested decision defines
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work group server operating systems as operating systems designed and
marketed to deliver collectively ‘basic infrastructure services’ to relatively
small numbers of client PCs connected to small or medium-sized networks
(recitals 53 and 345 to the contested decision)....
30
In the contested decision, the Commission finds that Microsoft
has had a dominant position on the client PC operating systems market
since at least 1996 and also on the work group server operating systems
market since 2002 (recitals 429 to 541 to the contested decision).
31
As regards the client PC operating systems market, the
Commission relies essentially on the following factors to arrive at that
conclusion:





Microsoft’s market shares are over 90% (recitals 430 to 435 to the
contested decision);
Microsoft’s market power has ‘enjoyed an enduring stability and
continuity’ (recital 436 to the contested decision);
there are significant barriers to market entry, owing to indirect
network effects (recitals 448 to 464 to the contested decision);
those network effects derive, first, from the fact that users like
platforms on which they can use a large number of applications and,
second, from the fact that software designers write applications for
the client PC operating systems that are the most popular among
users (recitals 449 and 450 to the contested decision)....

33
As regards the work group server operating systems market, the
Commission relies, in substance, on the following factors:







Microsoft’s market share is, at a conservative estimate, at least 60%
(recitals 473 to 499 to the contested decision);
the position of Microsoft’s three main competitors on that market is
as follows: Novell, with its NetWare software, has 10 to 25%;
vendors of Linux products have a market share of 5 to 15%; and
vendors of UNIX products have a market share of 5 to 15% (recitals
503, 507 and 512 to the contested decision);
the work group server operating systems market is characterised by
the existence of significant entry barriers, owing in particular to
network effects and to Microsoft’s refusal to disclose
interoperability information (recitals 515 to 525 to the contested
decision);
there are close commercial and technological links between the
latter market and the client PC operating systems market (recitals
526 to 540 to the contested decision).
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34
Linux is an ‘open source’ operating system released under the
‘GNU GPL (General Public Licence)’. Strictly speaking, it is only a code
base, called the ‘kernel’, which performs a limited number of services
specific to an operating system. It may, however, be linked to other layers
of software to form a ‘Linux operating system’ (recital 87 to the contested
decision). Linux is used in particular as the basis for work group server
operating systems (recital 101 to the contested decision) and is thus present
on the work group server operating systems market in conjunction with
Samba software, which is also released under the ‘GNU GPL’ licence
(recitals 506 and 598 to the contested decision).
35
‘UNIX’ designates a number of operating systems that share
certain common features (recital 42 to the contested decision). Sun has
developed a UNIX-based work group server operating system called
‘Solaris’ (recital 97 to the contested decision).
III – Abuse of a dominant position
A – Refusal to supply and authorise the use of interoperability
information
36
The first abusive conduct in which Microsoft is found to have
engaged consists in its refusal to supply its competitors with
‘interoperability information’ and to authorise the use of that information
for the purpose of developing and distributing products competing with
Microsoft’s own products on the work group server operating systems
market, between October 1998 and the date of notification of the contested
decision (Article 2(a) of the contested decision). That conduct is described
at recitals 546 to 791 to the contested decision....
39
A ‘protocol’ is defined as ‘a set of rules of interconnection and
interaction between various instances of Windows work group server
operating systems and Windows client PC operating systems running on
different computers in a Windows work group network’ (Article 1(2) of the
contested decision).
40
In the contested decision, the Commission emphasises that the
refusal in question does not relate to Microsoft’s ‘source code’, but only to
specifications of the protocols concerned, that is to say, to a detailed
description of what the software in question must achieve, in contrast to the
implementations, consisting in the implementation of the code on the
computer….
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569 First, the file shows that initially Microsoft supplied only client
PC operating systems and that it was a relatively late entrant to the server
operating systems market. It was only in the early 1990s that Microsoft
began to develop a server operating system – it marketed its first system,
‘Windows NT 3.5 Server’, in July 1992 – and it was only with ‘Windows
NT 4.0’, released in July 1996, that it first encountered real commercial
success (see, in particular, paragraph 50 of the response of 17 November
2000 to the first statement of objections and paragraphs 50 and 56 of the
application).
570 It is apparent from the IDC data, as reproduced at recital 591 to
the contested decision, that Microsoft’s market share, by units shipped, on
the market for operating systems for servers costing under USD 25 000
grew from 25.4% (24.5% by turnover) in 1996 to 64.9% (61% by turnover)
in 2002, a leap of almost 40% in just six years....
575 Second, it is apparent from the file that, alongside the evolution of
Microsoft’s position as described above, Novell experienced a continuous
decline on the work group server operating systems market and in just a few
years became a secondary player. At the time when Microsoft entered the
server operating systems market, the leading product for the supply of work
group services was Novell’s NetWare (see paragraph 56 of the application),
which had been present on that market since the mid-1980s....
619 The Commission had even more reason to conclude that there was
a risk that competition would be eliminated on that market because the
market has certain features which are likely to discourage organisations
which have already taken up Windows for their work group servers from
migrating to competing operating systems in the future. Thus, as the
Commission correctly states at recital 523 to the contested decision, it
follows from certain results of the third Mercer survey that the fact of
having an ‘established record as proven technology’ is seen as a significant
factor by the large majority of IT executives questioned. At the time of the
adoption of the contested decision, Microsoft, at a conservative estimate,
held a market share of at least 60% on the work group server operating
systems market (recital 499 to the contested decision). Likewise, certain
results of that survey also establish that the factor ‘available skill-sets and
cost/availability of support (in-house or external)’ is important for the
majority of the IT executives questioned. As the Commission quite
correctly states at recital 520 to the contested decision, ‘[that] means that
the easier it is to find technicians skilled in using a given work group server
operating system, the more customers are inclined to purchase that work
group server operating system’ and, ‘[i]n turn, however, the more popular a
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work group server operating system is among customers, the easier it is for
technicians (and the more willing are technicians) to acquire skills related to
that product’. Microsoft’s very high market share on the work group server
operating system market has the consequence that a very large number of
technicians possess skills which are specific to Windows operating systems.
620
The Court therefore concludes that the circumstance that the
refusal at issue entailed the risk of elimination of competition is present in
this case....
1231 By way of remedy for the abusive refusal to supply the
interoperability information, Article 5 of the contested decision orders
Microsoft to disclose, within 120 days of notification of that decision, that
information to any undertaking having an interest in developing and
distributing work group server operating systems and to allow, on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, those undertakings to use the
information in question to develop and distribute work group server
operating systems. Microsoft is also required to ensure that the
interoperability information disclosed is kept updated on an ongoing basis
and in a timely manner. Last, Article 5 of the contested decision orders
Microsoft, within 120 days of the date of notification of that decision, to set
up an evaluation mechanism that will give interested undertakings a
workable possibility of informing themselves about the scope and terms of
use of the interoperability information....
1233 Article 7 of the contested decision, moreover, provides for the
establishment of a suitable mechanism to assist the Commission in
monitoring Microsoft’s compliance with the contested decision and
including, in particular, the appointment of an independent monitoring
trustee. Article 7 provides that that mechanism is to form the subject-matter
of a proposal by Microsoft within 30 days of notification of the decision,
while in the event that the Commission considers that the proposed
mechanism is not suitable, it is to ‘retain the right to impose such a
mechanism by way of a decision’.
NOVELL V. MICROSOFT
2013 WL 5303259, __ F.3d __
(10th Cir. Oct. 2, 2013)
Gorsuch, Circuit Judge
A straggler of a case, this one drags us back twenty years. To a time
before the dot-com boom busted and boomed again, a time when Microsoft
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was busy amassing a virtual empire—if sometimes in violation of the
antitrust laws. Long since found liable for a rich diversity of antitrust
misdeeds in the 1990s, this case calls on us to decide whether Microsoft
back then committed still another, as-yet undetected antitrust violation—
this time at Novell's expense.
Novell's suit against Microsoft finally found its way to trial in 2011 but
the jury couldn't manage a verdict. Reviewing the record for itself after trial,
the district court decided it could fairly admit of only one conclusion:
Microsoft's conduct did not offend section 2 of the Sherman Act. So the
district court entered judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, a
decision Novell now asks us to overturn but one we find we cannot. Novell
complains that Microsoft refused to share its intellectual property with
rivals after first promising to do so. But the antitrust laws rarely impose on
firms—even dominant firms—a duty to deal with their rivals. With respect
to Novell at least, Microsoft did nothing unlawful.
***
....
By the mid–1990s Microsoft had become the leading provider of Intelcompatible personal computer operating systems. An operating system
amounts to the computer's core software—software that allows the everyday
user to take advantage of a computer's functions. . . .
. . . On one hand, Microsoft had some incentive to cooperate with ISVs.
After all, ISVs wrote applications for Microsoft's operating system;
increasing the number of applications that could run on Microsoft's
operating system meant increasing the utility of the operating system for
users; and that meant more sales for Microsoft. On the other hand,
Microsoft didn't just supply the operating system—it also competed with
ISVs in the development and sale of applications for use on its Windows
operating system. So, for example, by the mid–1990s, “office suites”
containing applications for word processing, spreadsheets, and other
everyday office tasks were all the rage and Microsoft began to offer its
Microsoft Office suite (including Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel) in
competition with ISVs. Among the ISVs with whom Microsoft competed
during this era was Novell. In the mid–1990s (and well before then), Novell
produced WordPerfect—Microsoft Word's leading rival in word processing
applications—and the company harbored ambitions to create an office suite
of its own to rival Microsoft Office, one it called PerfectOffice.
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....
As it was planning to roll out its Windows 95 operating system, the
successor to Windows 3.0, Microsoft faced the questions whether and to
what degree it should share its intellectual property with ISVs. Should it
share a pre-release development version of the new operating system, and
perhaps provide access to its internal workings, all to help ISVs develop
applications ready for use by the public when the final version of Windows
95 went on sale? The firm was torn. Doing so would help the marketing of
Windows 95, allowing the company to boast a robust range of applications
users could employ on the new operating system straight away. At the same
time, helping ISVs develop and sell applications threatened to hurt
Microsoft's own applications business, perhaps most especially its new
office suite product, Microsoft Office.
At first, Microsoft opted to share. Anticipating the release of Windows
95 to the public sometime in 1995, in June 1994 it shared a beta, or test,
version of the operating system with ISVs. At the same time, Microsoft also
gave ISVs access to Windows 95's application programming interfaces
(APIs). APIs allow programs to invoke the operating system's built-in
abilities to perform certain functions; each API consists of a set of named
procedures that automate particular tasks an application might need to
perform. By publishing the names of the procedures in an API and
providing information about how to invoke each one, Microsoft essentially
permitted ISVs a shortcut—they could rely on Microsoft's APIs when
writing their own code rather than having to design custom code to perform
the same functions.
....
Among the APIs Microsoft chose to share information about were
namespace extensions (NSEs). NSEs are a subset of APIs that permit a user
to see (and then open) documents affiliated not just with the current
application but located in wildly different places on the computer or
elsewhere. Familiar namespaces include the “Recycle Bin”—where a user
might dispose of an unwanted document—and the “Desktop”—the
computer's default screen that displays when the user starts up his computer.
If a user wants to open a document on the Desktop, she might click the
Desktop namespace icon on the left side of the file open dialog in the
application she is currently running, and watch the contents of the Desktop
appear on the right side of the window. With a double click, she might then
open the document. NSEs thus provide something of a shortcut to places
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outside the current application.
Novell thought access to these NSEs particularly key. Not only would
access to Microsoft's NSEs allow Novell to ensure users of its programs
could access, say, the Desktop and Recycle Bin without having to leave
WordPerfect. Access to Microsoft's NSEs would also allow Novell to create
custom namespaces of its own. So, for example, Novell had in mind the
possibility that someone in its WordPerfect program with the file open
dialog screen open could access, say, items in Novell's email application or
its ClipArt library, all for use in a WordPerfect document. Novell's hope
was to use NSEs to help make its product so useful that users might be able
to “live in” WordPerfect (or PerfectOffice) because they could open,
modify, and search for their files across the computer all while remaining
within the WordPerfect environment.
[A]fter first choosing to share so much of its intellectual property with
ISVs in the beta version distributed in June 1994, Microsoft reversed course
in October, indicating to ISVs that they could no longer rely on the
previously published APIs and that Microsoft would not guarantee the
operability of the previously published APIs in the final version of
Windows 95. The evidence suggests Microsoft did so because it concluded
that—on balance—this move would prove profit maximizing for the firm.
Withdrawing access to information about how to invoke APIs generally and
NSEs in particular would make it harder for ISVs to produce applications
for Windows 95 and in this way would marginally reduce the attractiveness
of Microsoft's new operating system. But withdrawing access would also
make Microsoft's own applications, including Microsoft Office, more
immediately attractive to users. While ISVs could eventually develop workarounds to give users the same effective experience, without advance access
to information about how to invoke Microsoft's APIs and NSEs, it would
take them time to do so. All the while, Microsoft's applications would have
a competitive advantage, being the first applications usable on Windows 95.
In an October 3, 1994 email, Bill Gates, Microsoft's CEO, explained as
much: “I have decided that we should not publish these [NSEs]. We should
wait until we have a way to do a high level of integration [which] will be
harder for the likes of Notes, WordPerfect to achieve, and which will give
[Microsoft] Office a real advantage.”
When Microsoft withdrew access to its NSEs, Novell contends its
business suffered. . . . While Novell was able to achieve the same
functionality for consumers, it took until May 1996, nine months after
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Windows 95's public release, for it to roll out its own applications for
Windows 95. That nine month delay, Novell argues, made all the
difference. Where once it had a leading word processing program and hopes
of a leading office suite, it contends the nine month delay gave Microsoft
Office a huge leg up, one that it alleges was designed to be and proved to be
a permanent advantage.
***
. . . It was after that trial in Utah Judge Motz entered judgment as a
matter of law for Microsoft—and it is that result Novell now asks us to
undo.
***
At this point, one might wonder: How did Microsoft's withdrawal of the
NSEs help it maintain a monopoly in the operating systems market?
Wouldn't the withdrawal of NSEs have prevented ISVs from writing
applications for Windows 95, at least to some degree? And wouldn't this
have hurt rather than helped Microsoft's sales of operating systems?
Withdrawing NSEs may have helped Microsoft's competitive position
against ISVs in selling applications, but any claim Novell might have
involving an applications market was lost long ago. Novell has to show that
withdrawing NSEs helped Microsoft maintain its dominant position in
operating systems. How could it have done that?
Novell offers two theories.
First, Novell argues that—but for Microsoft's withdrawal of the NSEs—
it would have released PerfectOffice earlier and acquired a greater
following for its products. This larger group of consumers—now freed from
dependence on Microsoft office suite applications—would have proven
more susceptible to the lure of other operating systems (like Linux) also
capable of running Novell's applications. Put simply, Novell alleges that by
delaying the release of WordPerfect, Microsoft was able to lock more
people into using Microsoft Office, and because Microsoft Office could
only run on a Windows operating system those consumers were then locked
into using a Windows operating system too.
Second, Novell explains that PerfectOffice was equipped with
middleware—PerfectFit and AppWare—that permitted ISVs to write
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applications directly for PerfectOffice rather than for the operating system.
If PerfectOffice could perform more of the tasks traditionally performed by
operating systems, more users would be more inclined to “live in”
PerfectOffice rather than Windows. And because PerfectOffice was
designed to work on other operating systems, these users too might be more
easily enticed away from Windows.
Could a rational trier of fact find Novell was a victim of unlawful
monopolization under these theories? To prevail on a section 2 claim, a
plaintiff generally must show the defendant possessed sufficient market
power to raise prices substantially above a competitive level without losing
so much business that the gambit becomes unprofitable. See United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). Then the plaintiff must show that
the defendant achieved or maintained that market power through the use of
anticompetitive conduct. See Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). Finally, a private plaintiff must show that its
injuries were caused by the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. See
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); 3
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 501, at 85 (3d
ed.2008). How do Novell's theories stack up against these standards?
***
...
Though often the focus of section 2 disputes, questions of market
definition and power aren't in play here. Microsoft doesn't dispute that in
the 1990s a nationwide product market existed for Intel-compatible personal
computer operating systems, as Novell alleges. Neither does Microsoft
dispute it possessed market power in that market. . . .
***
With issues of market definition and power by the board, our focus turns
to the next question in the sequence required to establish liability: Did
Microsoft engage in anticompetitive conduct in violation of section 2 when
it withdrew access to its NSEs from Novell and other ISVs? Or was this
legally permissible competition?
In earlier days, some courts suggested that a monopolist must lend
smaller rivals a helping hand. If a monopolist so much as expanded its
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facilities to meet anticipated demand, or failed to keep its prices high
enough to permit less efficient rivals to stay afloat, it could find itself held
liable under section 2. See, e.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430; Telex Corp. v. Int'l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925 (10th Cir.1975) (rejecting district
court's view that monopoly maintenance “need not be evidenced by
predatory practices”). The Supreme Court and this one, however, have long
and emphatically rejected this approach, realizing that the proper focus of
section 2 isn't on protecting competitors but on protecting the process of
competition, with the interests of consumers, not competitors, in mind.
Forcing monopolists to “hold[ ] an umbrella over inefficient competitors”
might make rivals happy but it usually leaves consumers paying more for
less. Olympia, 797 F.2d at 375; see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411; 3 Areeda
& Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 651, at 107.
So what exactly qualifies as anticompetitive conduct under section 2,
properly understood? It's been said that anticompetitive conduct comes in
too many forms and shapes to permit a comprehensive taxonomy. See
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767–68
(1984). But the question we often find ourselves asking is whether, based
on the evidence and experience derived from past cases, the conduct at issue
before us has little or no value beyond the capacity to protect the
monopolist's market power—bearing in mind the risk of false positives (and
negatives) any determination on the question of liability might invite, and
the limits on the administrative capacities of courts to police market terms
and transactions. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, § 651 a, at 96–97.
With time and a gathering body of experience, courts have been able to
adapt this general inquiry to particular circumstances, developing
considerably more specific rules for common forms of alleged
misconduct—like tying, Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461–62; exclusive
dealing, Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 69; or efforts to defraud or lie to regulators
or consumers, Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783–88
(6th Cir.2002); Caribbean, 148 F.3d at 1087.
As these common categories and the rules associated with them suggest,
section 2 misconduct usually involves some assay by the monopolist into
the marketplace—to limit the abilities of third parties to deal with rivals
(exclusive dealing), to require third parties to purchase a bundle of goods
rather than just the ones they really want (tying), or to defraud regulators or
consumers. By contrast, and “as a general rule ... purely unilateral conduct”
does not run afoul of section 2—“businesses are free to choose” whether or
not to do business with others and free to assign what prices they hope to
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secure for their own products. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns,
555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009). Put simply if perhaps a little too simply, today a
monopolist is much more likely to be held liable for failing to leave its
rivals alone than for failing to come to their aid. See id.; 3 Areeda &
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 658, at 183.
Many antitrust values lie behind the boundary line the law sketches
here. If the law were to make a habit of forcing monopolists to help
competitors by keeping prices high, sharing their property, or declining to
expand their own operations, courts would paradoxically risk encouraging
collusion between rivals and dampened price competition—themselves
paradigmatic antitrust wrongs, injuries to consumers and the competitive
process alike. Forcing firms to help one another would also risk reducing
the incentive both sides have to innovate, invest, and expand—again results
inconsistent with the goals of antitrust....
Administrability considerations are also at play here. If forced sharing
were the order of the day, courts would have to pick and choose the
applicable terms and conditions. That would not only risk judicial
complicity in collusion and dampened price competition. It would also
require us to become “central planners,” a role for which we judges lack
many comparative advantages and a role in which we haven't always
excelled in the past. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08; 3B Areeda &
Hovankamp, supra, ¶ 772, at 220.
The bottom line, then, is that antitrust evinces a belief that independent,
profit-maximizing firms and competition between them are generally good
things for consumers. Just as courts have held particular forms of antitrust
conduct per se illegal because experience teaches that they are almost
always destructive of competition, so too courts have fashioned rules of
presumptive legality for certain forms of conduct that experience teaches
almost never harm consumers. Experience teaches that independent firms
competing against one another is almost always good for the consumer and
thus warrants a strong presumption of legality. Acknowledging as much in
the form of a general rule gives a degree of predictability to judicial
outcomes and permits reliance by all market participants, themselves goods
for both the competitive process and the goal of equal treatment under the
law. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–8.
Of course, most every rule proves over- or under-inclusive in some way.
We often accept a degree of over- and under-inclusion as the price that must
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be paid for the benefits associated with a clear rule of law. But rarely is the
law so unsubtle that it fails to acknowledge and candidly account for at least
a rule's most glaring exceptions. And certainly section 2 doctrine isn't so
unsubtle. Though “rare,” liability can sometimes be assigned even when the
monopolist engages in “purely unilateral” conduct. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 555
U.S. at 448. Predatory pricing presents a notable and easy example. Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–23
(1993). Refusals to deal supplies is another if somewhat more controversial
example. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
600–01 (1985); see also 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 772. Essential
facilities doctrine offers perhaps an even more controversial example still.
Compare Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377–79
(1973) (forebearer of essential facilities doctrine), with Trinko, 540 U.S. at
411 (“We have never recognized such a doctrine.”).
Our case revolves around the second of these exceptions to the general
rule protecting unilateral conduct. Novell seeks to impose section 2 liability
on Microsoft for refusing to deal with its rivals. Initially, Microsoft chose to
share its internal NSE protocols with ISVs in an effort to spur them into
writing software for Windows 95. Then Microsoft reversed course,
choosing to keep its NSEs to itself. Normally, this sort of unilateral
behavior—choosing whom to deal with and on what terms—is protected by
the antitrust laws. Even a monopolist generally has no duty to share (or
continue to share) its intellectual or physical property with a rival. Novell
insists, however, that Microsoft had an affirmative duty to continue sharing
its intellectual property and that the firm's decision to withdraw that
assistance violated section 2. Predatory pricing appears nowhere in the case
and Novell disclaims any reliance on essential facilities doctrine. So if a
path to recovery lies anywhere for Novell, it lies through the narrow-eyed
needle of refusal to deal doctrine.
***
Refusal to deal doctrine's high water mark came in Aspen. There, this
court and the Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict finding liability when a
monopolist (Aspen Skiing Company) first voluntarily agreed to a sales and
marketing joint venture with a rival (Aspen Highlands) and then later
discontinued the venture even when the evidence suggested the arrangement
remained a profitable one. This result, however, falls “at or near the outer
boundary of § 2 liability.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. Since Aspen, the
Supreme Court has refused to extend liability to various other refusal to
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deal scenarios, emphasizing that Aspen represents a “limited exception” to
the general rule of firm independence. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. To invoke
Aspen's limited exception, the Supreme Court and we have explained, at
least two features present in Aspen must be present in the case at hand.
First, as in Aspen, there must be a preexisting voluntary and presumably
profitable course of dealing between the monopolist and rival. Trinko, 540
U.S. at 409; Four Corners, 582 F.3d at 1224–25; Christy Sports, 555 F.3d
at 1197....
Second, as in Aspen, the monopolist's discontinuation of the preexisting
course of dealing must “suggest[ ] a willingness to forsake short-term
profits to achieve an anti-competitive end.” Id. In Aspen, the Supreme Court
held, the evidence suggested that the parties' joint venture was profitable for
all concerned and that Aspen Skiing Company (the monopolist)
discontinued the arrangement simply to reduce the value of Aspen
Highlands, force Highlands to sell, and in this way allow the monopolist to
win control of all four ski mountains in Aspen. Much as in predatory
pricing doctrine, the animating concern here is that a dominant firm may be
able to forgo short-term profits longer than smaller rivals, and it may have
an incentive to take on those losses to drive rivals from the market or to
discipline them for having the audacity to try competition on the merits
rather than abide as price-takers under the monopolist's umbrella. Giving up
short-term profits in these particular circumstances may risk doing less to
enhance competition and consumer interests than to entrench a dominant
firm and enable it to extract monopoly rents once the competitor is killed
off or beaten down. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–23; 3 Areeda &
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 651, at 102–03.
Of course, firms routinely sacrifice short-term profits for lots of
legitimate reasons that enhance consumer welfare (think promotional
discounts). Neither is it unimaginable that a monopolist might wish to
withdraw from a prior course of dealing and suffer a short-term profit loss
in order to pursue perfectly procompetitive ends—say, to pursue an
innovative replacement product of its own. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp,
supra, ¶ 651, at 102–03. To avoid penalizing normal competitive conduct,
then, we require proof not just that the monopolist decided to forsake shortterm profits. Just as in predatory pricing cases, we also require a showing
that the monopolist's refusal to deal was part of a larger anticompetitive
enterprise, such as (again) seeking to drive a rival from the market or
discipline it for daring to compete on price. Put simply, the monopolist's

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 44
Oct. 2013

conduct must be irrational but for its anticompetitive effect. See Aspen, 472
U.S. at 597 (a refusal to deal with a competitor doesn't violate section 2 if
“valid business reasons exist for that refusal”); 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp,
supra, ¶ 772, at 223 (the refusal must be “irrational” but for its
anticompetitive tendencies); see also Gregory J. Werden, Identifying
Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73
Antitrust L.J. 413, 422–25 (2006).
At this point, one might object: refusal to deal doctrine requires the
monopolist to sacrifice short-term profits to be held liable, but surely a
monopolist can find ways to harm competition while still making money.
And that's undoubtedly right. Filing false papers with regulators and
misleading consumers or others, for example, don't (necessarily) involve the
short-term sacrifice of profits but can at least conceivably harm competition
as much as profit-sacrificing maneuvers. As we have already seen, though,
a rival is always free to bring a section 2 claim for affirmatively interfering
with its business activities in the marketplace. See, e.g., Caribbean, 148
F.3d at 1087; 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 782 (discussing
relationship between antitrust and business torts). Refusal to deal doctrine
targets only a discrete category of section 2 cases attacking a firm's
unilateral decisions about with whom it will deal and on what terms. It
doesn't seek to displace doctrines that address a monopolist's more direct
interference with rivals. …
***
There's no question that Novell can satisfy the first essential component
of refusal to deal doctrine. A voluntary and profitable relationship clearly
existed between Microsoft and Novell. Microsoft doesn't dispute that at first
it freely offered its applications rivals, including Novell, access to its NSEs.
Neither does Microsoft dispute that doing so was profitable enough,
encouraging software companies to write for its new operating system and
in that way making Windows more attractive to consumers.
The difficulty is that Novell has presented no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that Microsoft's discontinuation of this
arrangement suggested a willingness to sacrifice short-term profits, let alone
in a manner that was irrational but for its tendency to harm competition. To
the contrary, all the evidence suggests that Microsoft's decision came about
as a result of a desire to maximize the company's immediate and overall
profits. And, as we've seen, refusal to deal doctrine specifically and section
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2 generally seek to protect, not penalize, such prosaic profit-maximizing
(and presumptively pro-competitive) conduct by independently operating
firms, even dominant firms.
Within the operating systems market alone, it's not clear Microsoft lost
or expected to lose revenues in the short term—or ever. By withdrawing
NSEs, Microsoft may have handicapped the ability of ISVs to write for
Windows 95. But as Novell acknowledges, ISVs had a reasonably strong
incentive to write for Microsoft's operating system with or without access to
Window's NSEs—given Microsoft's significant presence in the operating
systems market (already about a 90 percent share before Windows 95). In
fact, the record suggests that Microsoft's market share continued to grow
even after the introduction of Windows 95 without shared NSEs (to at least
95 percent). To be sure, Novell's CEO testified that Windows 95 would
have done even better (to some unspecified degree) had Microsoft
continued to provide access to NSEs. But Novell's own expert refused to
opine on the question. And Novell's own theory of monopoly maintenance
posits that Microsoft's withdrawal of the NSEs helped its position in the
operating systems market by wedding consumers to Microsoft applications
that themselves could run only on its operating system. Perhaps Novell
would respond that this strategy only helped Microsoft in the long run after
a period of forgone short-term profits—but here again Novell presents no
evidence to support such a theory.
Besides, even assuming Microsoft's conduct did suggest a willingness to
forgo short-term profits in the operating systems market, that would still
account for only part of the story. As we've seen, Microsoft also produced
various applications and, by everyone's estimation, its withdrawal of the
NSEs helped the firm win additional profits in that field. Indeed, Novell's
theory in this lawsuit rests on the view that Microsoft's withdrawal of NSEs
allowed it to win significant profits in the sale of office suite applications—
and to do so immediately. Put differently, even if Microsoft's decision to
withdraw the NSEs ultimately made Windows 95 less successful, any losses
in that market have to be considered in light of the acknowledged and
immediate gains it achieved in the applications arena. Microsoft is an
integrated firm with the goal of maximizing overall profits. And viewed
overall, there's no evidence that Microsoft took any course other than
seeking to maximize the company's net profits in the shortas [sic] well as
long-term.
Perhaps Novell might reply that we should disaggregate operating
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systems from applications—that proof of a design to forgo short-term
profits in one line of business (operating systems) should suffice without
consideration of admittedly inevitable short-term gains in another
(applications). Novell, however, never attempts the argument for itself—
and for good reason. It would be inconsistent with both the formal aspects
and the reasoning behind Aspen and Trinko. In Aspen, the Supreme Court
found that Aspen Skiing Company's conduct had no economic justification
except its tendency to exclude a rival. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608. Neither did
the Court disaggregate profits from different lines of business in Trinko: in
concluding that Verizon's behavior failed to show a willingness to sacrifice
short-term profits, the Court didn't separately consider the wholesale and
retail markets at play there. The point of the profit sacrifice test is to isolate
conduct that has no possible efficiency justification. See id. Parsing profits
from different product lines would defeat this project, holding firms liable
for making moves that enhance their overall efficiency, if at the expense of
a particular business line. It would risk as well returning us to a day when
larger firms had to forgo immediate overall gains in order to subsidize a less
efficient rival that happens to do business only in one particular product
line. And it would present a serious administration challenge to say the
least. After all, businesses have the ability “to recoup [their] investment[s]”
in any number of ways. Christy Sports, 555 F.3d at 1194. And selling
operating systems surely isn't the only way to recoup the costs of
developing a new operating system—a company might just as easily recoup
costs through the sale of applications designed for that operating system.
All this courts would have to account for and police.
When pressed at oral argument to point to evidence of Microsoft's
willingness to sacrifice short-term profits, Novell contended that Mr.
Gates's internal October 3, 1994 email did the trick. That email, however,
indicates only a desire to keep NSEs from rivals “until we have a way to do
a high level of integration [that] will be harder for the likes of Notes,
WordPerfect to achieve, and which will give Office a real advantage.”
J.A.1967. This may suggest a hard-nosed intent to undo rivals in the
applications field, to assure Microsoft a leg up, but it doesn't suggest
Microsoft intended to forgo profits. More nearly, it suggests just the
opposite—a wish to increase the firm's immediate profits—and in this way
it tends to show that Microsoft's conduct was hardly irrational but for its
exclusionary tendencies. Maybe the e-mail suggests an uncharitable intent
toward rivals, maybe even a wish to “hurt” or “destroy” them. But as we've
seen, experience teaches that the process of firms investing in their own
infrastructure and intellectual property and competing rather than colluding
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normally promotes competition and consumer gains—and the intent to undo
a competitor in this process should hardly surprise. “Competition,” after all,
“is a ruthless process.” Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1338. “Most
businessmen don't like their competitors” and the antitrust laws aren't
designed to be a guide to good manners. Olympia, 797 F.2d at 379....
***
Still, that is not quite the end of the story. Unable to travel the hard road
of refusal to deal doctrine, Novell seeks an escape route, trying to recast
Microsoft's conduct as an “affirmative” act of interference with a rival
rather than a “unilateral” refusal to deal. Novell says Microsoft
“affirmatively” induced reliance on its intellectual property only then to pull
the rug out from underneath it, raising Novell's cost of doing business in the
process—and that, Novell says, should be enough to state a claim under
section 2. Essentially Novell asks us to toy with the act-omission
distinction, seeking to have us describe Microsoft's conduct as an
“affirmative” act of interference rather than an “omission” of assistance,
and to replace the profit sacrifice test with a raising rivals' cost test.
Traditional refusal to deal doctrine is not so easily evaded. One could
just as easily recast the monopolists' “withdrawals” of assistance in Aspen
or Trinko as “affirmative” acts of interference with the plaintiff's efforts to
win customers, ones that raised the rival's costs of doing business in the
process. Indeed, in almost any case where a monopolist first shares and then
withdraws its property—as in Aspen and Trinko—the dominant firm might
be said to raise the rival's costs of doing business by forcing it to forgo
reliance on the monopolist's facilities or intellectual property and compete
on its own. That's the whole reason why competitors sue for refusals to
deal—because they now have to incur costs associated with doing business
another firm previously helped subsidize. Yet neither Trinko nor Aspen
Skiing suggested this is enough to evade their profit sacrifice test, and we
refuse to do so either. Whether one chooses to call a monopolist's refusal to
deal with a rival an act or omission, interference or withdrawal of
assistance, the substance is the same and it must be analyzed under the
traditional test we have outlined.
…
Novell seeks to evade refusal to deal doctrine in one final way. It
charges Microsoft with acting deceptively when it withdrew the NSEs.
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Microsoft gave pretextual technical reasons for withdrawing the NSEs,
Novell says, when Microsoft's real reasons were competitive in nature. This
act of deception, Novell submits, is actionable under the antitrust laws
without regard to traditional refusal to deal doctrine.
Business torts generally, and acts of fraud more particularly, can
sometimes give rise to antitrust liability. At least when the defendant's
deceptive actions—usually aimed at third parties in the marketplace—are so
widespread and longstanding and practically incapable of refutation that
they are capable of injuring both consumers and competitors. See, e.g.,
Caribbean, 148 F.3d at 1087; Conwood, 290 F.3d at 783; 3B Areeda &
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 782b. Here, however, at least that last element is
missing. Whatever other problems exist with Novell's theory, it falters when
it comes to the antitrust injury requirement.
Suppose Microsoft had admitted its “real” reasons for withdrawing the
NSEs, as Novell says it should have. Novell and consumers still would have
suffered the same alleged harm—the delayed release of PerfectOffice.
Deception, then, wasn't the cause of Novell's injury or any possible harm to
consumers—Microsoft's refusal to deal was. And that refusal to deal must
be analyzed under the doctrine we've described. The antitrust laws don't
turn private parties into bounty hunters entitled to a windfall anytime they
can ferret out anticompetitive conduct lurking somewhere in the
marketplace. To prevail, a private party must establish some link between
the defendant's alleged anticompetitive conduct, on the one hand, and its
injuries and the consumer's, on the other. Here, that essential element is
missing: the conduct Novell complains about (deception) is divorced from
the conduct that allegedly caused harm to it and to consumers (the refusal to
deal). Even if Microsoft had behaved just as Novell says it should have, it
would have helped Novell not at all. See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.
***
At the end of the day it is clear to us, as it was to the district court, that
Microsoft's conduct does not qualify as anticompetitive behavior within the
meaning of section 2. The district court offered still other rationales for
rejecting Novell's claim—ruling that Microsoft's conduct didn't harm
competition in the operating systems market, and that Novell's delay in
producing its Windows 95 software was really attributable to its own
mismanagement and not Microsoft's withdrawal of the NSEs. We have no
need to reach those alternative holdings or tangle with the parties'
arguments over them. The district court's first and primary holding is
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correct and sufficient to support the judgment. Novell's motion to seal
portions of the joint appendix is granted. The judgment is affirmed.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The European Competition provision on “Abuse of a Dominant
Position” states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States."
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
Contrast this with §2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2, which
condemns everyone “who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize.”
Note: The United States Antitrust Law of Refusal to Deal
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether or
not a firm violates antitrust laws by refusing to deal with a competitor in
both Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985) and Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
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Aspen involved a dispute between two competing ski resorts: Ski Co.,
which owned three of the four mountains available for skiing in a
geographic area, and Highlands Skiing, which owned the other mountain.
Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 589-601. The dispute arose when Ski Co.
stopped participating in a joint ski pass that allowed skiers to purchase one
pass and have access to all four mountains. The Court held that “the absence
of an unqualified duty to cooperate” did not mean this “may not have
evidentiary significance” or that it “may not give rise to liability in certain
circumstances.” Ski Co. was in violation of section 2 since Ski Co. was not
able to provide a valid business justification for discontinuing its
participation in the joint program.
In its Trinko decision two decades later he Supreme Court severely
limited the circumstances under which a defendant can violate §2 of the
Sherman Act by refusing to deal. The plaintiffs brought a class action suit
alleging tthat Verizon refused to provide AT&T with access to its systems
and support operations in a reasonable manner, thereby impairing AT&T’s
ability to pro- vide competitive services. The Court held that the refusal to
deal did not violate pre-existing antitrust standards because it did “not
believe that traditional antitrust principles justify adding the present case to
the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to aid
competitors.” Additionally, the Court described Aspen as “at or near the
outer boundary of § 2 liability” and noted the Court was “very cautious”
about recognizing exceptions to the general rule against requiring a firm to
cooperate with its competitors. The Court further cautioned against antitrust
intervention noting that “[u]nder the best of circumstances, applying the
requirements of § 2 ‘can be difficult”’ and that the “cost of false positives
counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.” Id. at 414 (quoting
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
The European approach declared in the principal case appears to be
significantly more interventionist than the United States position. See also
European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2008). The Guidance defines “abuse”
as "a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to
supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of
the dominant undertaking."
One important qualification on Trinko, however, is that the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c), requires virtually global
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interconnection between the market dominating incumbent telephone
carriers and the “competitive” carriers that want to hook into the telephone
system. As a result the competitive carrier in Trinko had already obtained
full relief from the Federal Communications Commission and state
telecommunications agencies, which held that Verizon was in violation of
its interconnection obligations. As a result, what the Supreme Court really
decided was that the antitrust laws could not be used as an overlay to a
regulatory system that was already in place in order to justify an award of
treble damages to the plaintiffs. See the Talkamerica case, infra. On the
antitrust law of refusal to deal in regulated industries, see 3B PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶787 (3d ed. 2007).
ALLIED ORTHOPEDIC APPLIANCES, INC. V. TYCO HEALTH
CARE GROUP, LP
592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010)
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs in this antitrust suit are a group of hospitals and other health
care providers that purchased pulse oximetry sensors from Tyco Healthcare
Group LP after November 2003. They allege that … by introducing
OxiMax, a patented pulse oximetry system that is incompatible with generic
sensors, Tyco unlawfully maintained its monopoly over the sensor market
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
The district court … granted Tyco’s motion for summary judgment on
the Section 1 and 2 claims… We … agree that there is no Section 2
violation; the undisputed evidence shows that the patented OxiMax design
is an improvement over the previous design. Innovation does not violate the
antitrust laws on its own, and there is no evidence that Tyco used its
monopoly power to force customers to adopt its new product. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s judgment on the merits …
The pulse oximetry products at issue in this litigation include sensors
and monitors. Sensors attach to a patient’s body. A monitor receives and
interprets the signal from a sensor and then displays the patient’s level of
blood oxygenation. Stand-alone monitors measure only blood oxygenation.
Multi-parameter monitors measure various patient diagnostics in addition to
blood oxygenation. Monitors are more expensive than sensors on a unit
basis, but the volume of sensor sales is much larger than the volume of
monitor sales.
Tyco was an early entrant in the pulse oximetry market and was able to
establish an installed base of monitors greatly exceeding that of its
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competitors. Its technology was initially protected by its “R-Cal” patent,
which prevented competitors from selling sensors compatible with its
installed base of monitors. Tyco anticipated that upon expiration of the RCal patent in November 2003, competitors would begin to produce generic
sensors compatible with its installed base of monitors. It thus set about
creating a new proprietary oximetry technology.
Tyco’s plan matured into what became known as the “OxiMax
Strategy.” Tyco created a new patented sensor design that contained a
writable memory chip. Moving the digital memory chip from the monitor to
the sensor allowed Tyco to add new features to the OxiMax sensors, such as
the ability to store the patient’s oxygen saturation history in the sensor itself
(the “sensor event reporting” feature) and the ability to inform a physician
of possible causes of and solutions for signal interruption (the “sensor
messaging” feature).
The digital memory chip also allowed Tyco to move essential
calibration coefficients from the monitors into the sensors themselves.
Because the new OxiMax monitors do not contain any calibration
coefficients, they are incompatible with generic sensors. However, OxiMax
monitors are compatible with new types of sensors that Tyco develops.
Previously, when Tyco introduced a new sensor, customers either had to
buy a new monitor or reprogram their entire installed base of stand-alone
and multiparameter monitors with the appropriate calibration coefficients.
With the OxiMax system, customers can adopt new types of sensors
without affecting their installed base of monitors because the necessary
coefficients are contained in the sensors themselves. This reduces costs for
customers and frees sensor designers from having to use the predefined
coefficients programmed into the installed base of monitors. Moving the
calibration coefficients into the sensors therefore facilitates the development
and introduction of new types of sensors.
Tyco launched OxiMax in March 2002 and notified equipment
manufacturers that all remaining R-Cal boards were being discontinued in
February 2003….
… The [district] court held that Tyco’s … introduction of OxiMax,
both alone and in combination with its other business practices, was not
unreasonably restrictive of competition under Section 2. The OxiMax
design was a “superior and more sophisticated offering than the previous
generation R-Cal system” and Tyco “did nothing to force OxiMax monitors
on its customers.” Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s final
judgment. We affirm….
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“There are three essential elements to a successful claim of Section 2
monopolization: (a) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and (c)
causal ‘antitrust’ injury.” Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979) (“ CalComp ”). For purposes of
Tyco’s motion and this appeal, the parties agree that Tyco is a monopolist
in the U.S. pulse oximetry sensor market. The focus of the dispute is
whether Tyco unlawfully maintained its monopoly power in that market by
introducing OxiMax.
Plaintiffs contend that Tyco maintained its monopoly by (1) designing
its new patent-protected OxiMax sensors to be compatible with its new
OxiMax monitors and the installed base of R-Cal monitors, but designing
its new OxiMax monitors to be incompatible with the old R-Cal sensors;
and (2) allegedly forcing customers and OEMs to adopt the new OxiMax
monitors by discontinuing its R-Cal monitors and implementing other
exclusionary business practices. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred
in rejecting these arguments because it did not balance the benefits of
Tyco’s alleged product improvement against its anticompetitive effects.
They further argue that the district court impermissibly decided disputed
issues of material fact regarding the sufficiency of Tyco’s innovation and
the competitive effect of its overall OxiMax strategy. We agree with the
district court.
“Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes ‘monopolization’; it does not
render unlawful all monopolies.” Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1983). “A monopolist, no less than
any other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete
aggressively on the merits, and any success it may achieve solely through
‘the process of invention and innovation’ is necessarily tolerated by the
antitrust laws.” Id. at 544-45 (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2nd Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, “[a]s a general rule,
courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been
harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.” United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C.Cir.2001).
However, changes in product design are not immune from antitrust
scrutiny and in certain cases may constitute an unlawful means of
maintaining a monopoly under Section 2. Foremost, 703 F.2d at 545. For
example, in United States v. Microsoft, the plaintiffs showed that Microsoft
harmed competition by integrating its Web browser, Internet Explorer, into
the Windows 98 operating system. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65-66. Microsoft
provided no “procompetitive justification,” id. at 59, for having integrated
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Internet Explorer into Windows. Having failed to show “that its conduct
serve[d] a purpose other than protecting its operating system monopoly,”
the D.C. Circuit held that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
In contrast, a design change that improves a product by providing a new
benefit to consumers does not violate Section 2 absent some associated
anticompetitive conduct. See CalComp, 613 F.2d at 735-36 (holding that a
design change must not be “unreasonably restrictive of competition”). In
CalComp, a manufacturer of peripheral computer devices argued that “IBM
made design changes on certain of its CPUs, disk drives and controllers of
no technological advantage and solely for the purpose of frustrating
competition” from peripheral device manufacturers. Id. at 739. However,
there was uncontroverted evidence that IBM’s changes allowed it to reduce
manufacturing costs and prices to the consumer and also improved
performance of the product. Id. at 744.
CalComp … therefore stand[s] for the uncontroversial proposition that
product improvement by itself does not violate Section 2, even if it is
performed by a monopolist and harms competitors as a result. See IIIB
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 776a at 285-86 (3d ed. 2006) (“At the very least,
as all courts recognize, product improvement without more is protected and
beyond antitrust challenge.”). There is no violation of Section 2 unless
plaintiff proves that some conduct of the monopolist associated with its
introduction of a new and improved product design “constitutes an
anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power, or a predatory or
exclusionary means of attempting to monopolize the relevant market.”
There is no room in this analysis for balancing the benefits or worth of a
product improvement against its anticompetitive effects. If a monopolist’s
design change is an improvement, it is “necessarily tolerated by the antitrust
laws,” unless the monopolist abuses or leverages its monopoly power in
some other way when introducing the product. To hold otherwise “would be
contrary to the very purpose of the antitrust laws, which is, after all, to
foster and ensure competition on the merits.” “Antitrust scholars have long
recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee product design, and
any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross-purposes with
antitrust law.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
To weigh the benefits of an improved product design against the
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is unadministrable.
There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the “right” amount of
innovation, which would maximize social gains and minimize competitive
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injury….
In this case, it is undisputed that by placing a digital memory chip in the
sensor and moving the calibration coefficients from the monitor to the
sensor, Tyco made its new OxiMax system incompatible with generic
sensors and harmed generic sensor manufacturers. We must therefore
decide whether there remains a genuine issue that the OxiMax sensor design
provided some new benefit to consumers and thus constituted an
improvement.
First, the United States Patent and Trademark Office found the OxiMax
sensor design to be sufficiently innovative over the prior art to deserve a
patent…. Although, as the district court properly noted, there is not a per se
rule barring Section 2 liability on patented product innovation, the existence
of a patent on a new product design is some evidence that the change is an
improvement over previous designs. After all, “the proper amount of gains
to innovation are left to Congress, who has the authority to vary the terms of
patent protections, the point in time from which the protections run, or the
scope of patentable innovations.” IIIB AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 777d at
311.
Second, it is undisputed that Tyco’s new sensor design allows it to
introduce new types of sensors without requiring its customers to purchase
new monitors or reprogram their installed base of monitors. This added
flexibility promotes the introduction of new types of sensors, such as MaxFast, and reduces costs for consumers of pulse oximetry equipment. It also
allows new functions, such as sensor event reporting and sensor messaging,
to be included in the sensors themselves.
Tyco’s internal documents show that from the very earliest stages of its
development of OxiMax, it aimed to produce a new technology that both
served as “a new, flexible platform for future oximetry innovation” and
added customer value by improving performance. To ensure that the new
feature set enabled by OxiMax would help to differentiate its new sensors
from generics, Tyco surveyed clinicians and initially received positive
feedback. Plaintiffs focus on statements showing that Tyco hoped its new
technology would constitute a barrier to entry for generic sensor
manufacturers. However, even legitimate product improvement can have
the effect of harming or even destroying competitors.
Likewise, Plaintiffs mistakenly focus on documents showing that,
sometime in 2001, Tyco began to realize that the sensor messaging and
sensor event reporting features were less valuable than it initially believed
and worried that the market would perceive its new technology as nothing
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more than a way to lock out generics. These documents do not create a
genuine issue of material fact about whether OxiMax represented an
improvement over previous sensor designs. Since technological innovation
“is accompanied by tremendous uncertainty as to cost, technical success,
and eventual market success ... ex post realizations are rarely a useful
indicator of ex ante expectations.” IIIB AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 775c at
284. Evidence of an innovator’s initial intent may be helpful to the extent
that it shows that the innovator knew all along that the new design was no
better than the old design, and thus introduced the design solely to eliminate
competition. But the documents here show that Tyco initially believed that
clinicians would value the new feature set.…
In sum, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to refute that the patented
OxiMax sensor design facilitates the introduction of new types of sensors
with added capabilities at less cost to consumers. The district court properly
concluded that Plaintiffs had not created a genuine issue of material fact on
whether OxiMax was a genuine improvement.
Tyco Did Not Use Its Market Power to Force Adoption of OxiMax
Although it is undisputed that the OxiMax sensor design is an
improvement over previous designs, Tyco may still have violated Section 2
if any of its other conduct “constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage
of monopoly power, or a predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to
monopolize the relevant market.”
Plaintiffs argue that Tyco forced consumers to adopt OxiMax by
discontinuing the older R-Cal technology. A monopolist’s discontinuation
of its old technology may violate Section 2 if it effectively forces
consumers to adopt its new technology. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287 n.
39. Here, however, there was uncontroverted evidence that [other suppliers
of pulse oximetry monitors and sensors effectively competed with Tyco].
Given all these alternatives, Tyco did not force consumers to purchase its
OxiMax monitors simply by discontinuing its support of the R-Cal
technology.
Plaintiffs’ argument that Tyco could have made its monitors compatible
with the old sensors also fails. Our precedents make clear that a monopolist
has no duty to help its competitors survive or expand when introducing an
improved product design. The evidence shows that the OxiMax monitors’
incompatibility with R-Cal sensors was the necessary consequence of
moving the calibration coefficients from the monitor into the sensor. Thus,
the product improvement at issue in this case, not some associated conduct
by Tyco, caused the incompatibility….
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In sum, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Tyco used its
monopoly power to force consumers of pulse oximetry products to adopt its
new OxiMax technology. Absent evidence of such compulsion, the only
rational inference that can be drawn from some consumers’ adoption of
OxiMax is that they regarded it to be a superior product. Berkey, 603 F.2d at
287. The district court therefore properly concluded that Plaintiffs had
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Tyco’s
introduction of OxiMax and properly granted summary judgment on the
Section 2 claim.
AFFIRMED.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. How much faith does the Ninth Circuit have in a court’s ability to assess
whether a design change is anticompetitive? As the court observed:
[Weighing] the benefits of an improved product design against the
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is
unadministrable. There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate
the ‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social
gains and minimize competitive injury....The balancing test
proposed by plaintiffs would therefore require courts to weigh asyet-unknown benefits against current competitive injuries. Our
precedents and the precedents we have relied upon strongly counsel
against such a test.
Orthopedic Appliances, 592 F.3d at 1000. Why does this Court come to this
conclusion? Does it present any contrary authority that supports a different
holding? Is there any instance when an innovation can be held in violation
of antitrust law? What if Tyco forced consumers to adopt the new
technology? More recently, the Northern District of California granted
defendant Apple’s motion for summary judgment in a case involving an
alleged anticompetitive effect of an innovation. The Apple iPod iTunes
Antitrust Litigation, 5:05-cv-00037-JW (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011). In relying
on Orthopedic Appliances, Judge Ware held that software updates to iTunes
4.7 constituted a “genuine improvement” and could not support an antitrust
claim. However, it denied summary judgment with respect to other design
changes that appeared to produce incompatabilities with the plaintiff’s
products but were not shown to be an improvement. See the following note
on software redesigns.
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By contrast, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1371
(Fed.Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999), the Federal Circuit
affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a case where the defendant
redesigned its skin graft gun so as to make it incompatible with rivals’
generic disposable needles. In this case there was no evidence that the gun
represented a genuine product improvement. Should the test be whether the
product as measured after the fact ends up not being an improvement, or
whether the defendant never intended for it to be an improvement to begin
with but only to create an incompatibility with the products of rivals? See
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 11
(2011). For severe criticism of Bard, see Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs,
Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. (2012).
See also In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2010 WL 4542454 (F.T.C. Nov.
2, 2010). Intel is the dominant maker of central processing units (CPUs) for
personal computers. Rival firms built CPUs but also graphics processing
units (GPUs) for computers that process a great deal of graphics. When the
rivals began building GPUs so as to take on some of the functions
performed by CPUs, Intel allegedly attempted to limit interoperability
between its CPU and its rivals’ GPUs, thereby reducing “future competition
on both price and innovation” between Intel and its rivals. The parties
entered a consent decree which required Intel to support a standard interface
between its CPUs and its rivals’ GPU. For excellent commentary of the
issues raised in both Intel and Microsoft, see William H. Page & Seldon J.
Childers, Antitrust, Innovation, and Product Design in Platform Markets:
Microsoft and Intel (Aug. 22, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914737.
2. Exclusionary Software Redesigns. One reason for our very considerable
tolerance of product redesigns is that they are costly and risky, as the
defendant’s technology in the principal case almost certainly was. A firm is
highly unlikely to invest millions of dollars in a new product for the sole
purpose of making a rival’s technology incompatible. Suppose, however,
that the product design involves nothing more than software code, which
can cheaply be rewritten so as to eliminate compatibility with rivals’
produts. See, e.g.. Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. C 05-00037 JW,
2011 WL 2690511 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011), in which the plaintiff class
action accuse Apple of altering its iPod/iTunes software to prevent a rival’s
products from playing on Apple’s hardware. The plaintiffs alleged that
Apple’s software redesign served no procompetitive purpose and that Apple
had yet to “allege some procompetitive justification other than merely

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 59
Oct. 2013

foreclosing rivals.” A similar issue was raised in United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See John M. Newman,
Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 38 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. (2012), who argues that our tolerance for anticompetitive design
generally should be modified if the product is computer software – most
particularly, software operating systems in which compatibility with the
hardware, applications, or other products of rivals is essential. Newman
observes that (1) software updates are a “uniquely attractive method of
foreclosing rivals,” and (2) software redesigns are “more easily analyzed
than traditional, physical-product redesigns,” because experts can isolate
specific sections of code to separate anticompetitive design elements from
procompetitive innovations. An expert was used for this purpose in
Microsoft, supra. Courts should consider a defendant’s intent only in
“ambiguous” cases—though Newman argues that “code-based product
redesigns will rarely present a truly ‘ambiguous’ case.”
3. The grandparent of product redesign cases is Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). Kodak simultaneously
introduced a radically redesigned amateur camera, the 110 “Pocket
Instamatic,” which used a film cartridge that dropped right into the camera,
much easier than older technologies that required film to be strung onto a
take up reel. The new camera was a roaring success and significantly upset
the market for older technologies, but until the two products could be reengineered by rivals the camera and film were compatible only with each
other. The plaintiff, a rival camera maker, could not reasonably attack the
design itself, which was acknowledged to be a great technological
improvement. Rather, it argued that Kodak had a duty to ‘predisclose” its
research plans so that rivals would have an opportunity to get on the market
earlier with their own compatible products. In rejecting that claim the court
observed:
[E]nforced predisclosure would cause undesirable consequences
beyond merely encouraging the sluggishness the Sherman Act was
designed to prevent. A significant vice of the theory propounded by
Berkey lies in the uncertainty of its application. Berkey does not
contend, in the colorful phrase of Judge Frankel [author of the district
court’s opinion], that “Kodak has to live in a goldfish bowl,” disclosing
every innovation to the world at large. However predictable in its
application, such an extreme rule would be insupportable. Rather,
Berkey postulates that Kodak had a duty to disclose limited types of
information to certain competitors under specific circumstances. But it
is difficult to comprehend how a major corporation, accustomed though
it is to making business decisions with antitrust considerations in mind,
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could possess the omniscience to anticipate all the instances in which a
jury might one day in the future retrospectively conclude that
predisclosure was warranted. And it is equally difficult to discern
workable guidelines that a court might set forth to aid the firm's
decision. For example, how detailed must the information conveyed be?
And how far must research have progressed before it is “ripe” for
disclosure? These inherent uncertainties would have an inevitable
chilling effect on innovation. They go far, we believe, towards
explaining why no court has ever imposed the duty Berkey seeks to
create here.
4. In Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 697
F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal
of Plaintiff Static Control Components, Inc.’s (“Static Control”) federal
antitrust claims because it insufficiently alleged that it had standing to sue for
damages. Static Control’s antitrust claims arise from conduct by Lexmark
International, Inc. (“Lexmark”), a manufacturer of laser printers and toner
cartridges, to prevent third parties from refilling used Lexmark toner
cartridges and reselling them. To combat remanufacturers’ business model,
Lexmark added microchips to its toner cartridges and printers such that a
Lexmark printer would not work unless the toner cartridge had the microchip.
Static Control figured out how to copy the microchips and sold the microchips
to remanufacturers that refill and resell Lexmark toner cartridges. Upset with
remanufacturers, Lexmark redesigned the microchips and initiated a
“Prebate” program. Under the redesign, the new microchips disabled the
cartridge once it ran out of toner. To reuse the cartridge, the microchip had
to be replaced, but getting replacements was difficult because the company
that produced them agreed to sell only to Lexmark. Under the Prebate
program:
Lexmark would sell new toner cartridges [to large customers] at an
upfront discount of around 20% if the end user agreed to (1) a single-use
license and (2) a restriction that the cartridge be returned to Lexmark for
remanufacturing or recycling and not to a third-party remanufacturer.
Lexmark eventually obtained several patents for its toner cartridges and
sued Static Control for infringement. Static Control counterclaimed under
the Sherman Act, alleging that Lexmark’s microchip redesign and Prebate
program were anticompetitive. The district court granted Lexmark’s motion
to dismiss, holding that Static Control lacked antitrust standing. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed.
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When bringing an antitrust claim for damages, a private plaintiff must
establish that he has antitrust standing under the following five-factor
balancing test:
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and harm to the
plaintiff and whether that harm was intended to be caused; (2) the nature
of the plaintiff's alleged injury including the status of the plaintiff as
consumer or competitor in the relevant market; (3) the directness or
indirectness of the injury, and the related inquiry of whether the
damages are speculative; (4) the potential for duplicative recovery or
complex apportionment of damages; and (5) the existence of more
direct victims of the alleged antitrust violation. Southaven Land Co. v.
Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1085 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters (“AGC”), 459 U.S. 519, 537–45 (1983)). No one factor
controls.
The Sixth Circuit found that Static Control’s allegations did not
establish the first AGC factor. “Static Control alleges that Lexmark's
anticompetitive chips “exclude competition, restrict output, and increase
end-user prices in the relevant markets,” but the counterclaim never
identifies any change in competition, output, or prices in the market for
component parts or microchips as a result of Lexmark's conduct.” Static
Control also lacked standing because Lexmark’s Prebate program was not
intended to harm Static Control:
As alleged, the Prebate Program targets only the market for
remanufactured cartridges. No part of the Prebate Program relates to the
market for microchips or components, even though the allegations
support the Prebate Program’s incidental effects in the other markets.
Static Control itself states that “Lexmark specifically launched its
Prebate program to intimidate and to exclude competition from
remanufacturers.”
The Sixth Circuit also found that Static Control failed to establish
standing because it did not satisfy the second AGC factor.
[O]nly claimants who are competitors or consumers within the injured
market have standing to sue. Southaven, 715 F.2d at 1086. However,
claimants who are not direct players in the relevant market may
nonetheless have standing if their injury is “‘inextricably intertwined’
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with the injury sought to be inflicted upon the relevant market or
participants therein.” Id.
Static Control also failed to establish the last three AGC factors, “which
all relate to the directness of Static Control’s injuries relative to potentially
more-direct victims.” While Static Control’s injuries are a “byproduct” of
Lexmark’s conduct, “The more-direct victims are the end users, who . . .
had to pay more for their cartridges, . . . and the remanufacturers, who were
unable to compete in the market for Lexmark-compatible toner cartridges
after Lexmark’s Prebate program undercut their prices and reduced supply.”
If Static Control had standing based on its indirect injuries, then there would
be a “danger of duplicative recovery.”
The Sixth Circuit also found insufficient Static Control’s allegations that
Lexmark harmed competition by redesigning microchips. Under Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), Static
Control might have had standing to pursue its claims if it had alleged that
Lexmark maintained its monopoly on remanufactured cartridges by
“making cartridge parts wholly unavailable.”
Static Control does not specifically allege a tying scheme under § 1 of
the Sherman Act, as was the case in Eastman Kodak, nor does Static
Control allege any facts to suggest that the prices for parts increased as a
result of being illegally tied to the market for cartridges. Static Control
alleges that Lexmark continuously redesigned its microchips “to
exclude competitors from the relevant markets, restrict output, and
increase end-user prices.”
Additionally, Static Control failed to allege how Lexmark’s redesigns
harmed competition or who it competes with in the market for microchips.
Absent these allegations, Static Control cannot establish that it has standing
to pursue a claim based on Lexmark’s microchip redesign efforts.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over patent infringement suits in a well pleaded complaint. 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a). However, in Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), the Supreme Court held that
this exclusive jurisdiction extends to original claims but not to
counterclaims. In Static Control, Lexmark initially filed a copyright
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infringement suit. Then Static counterclaimed alleging misuse and antitrust
violations, and only then did Lexmark file a counterclaim to the
counterclaim alleging patent infringement. So under the law that existed
when Lexmark filed its lawsuit the appeal went to the regional Circuit, the
Sixth. Subsequently, however, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
provided for exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction over “any civil action in
which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under[ ] any
Act of Congress relating to patents.” The amendment was explicitly made
prospective only, however, “to any civil action commenced on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.” Pub.L. 112–29, § 19(b), (e), 125 Stat.
333. An action such as this one filed today would be appealed to the
Federal Circuit.
2. Why didn’t the court dismiss the counterclaim because there is no
relevant market for “Lexmark cartridges,” given that Lexmark is only one
of many players in the market for computer printers, with a market share of
under 15%?
3. The court observes the challenged practices were intended to increase
the sale of cartridges supplied by Lexmark itself by making it much more
difficult for consumers to use remanufactured cartridges. So clearly a
“target” of the practices was the remanufacturers. But the microchips are
used on the cartridges in a one-to-one ratio. Wouldn’t Static Controls have
exactly the same injury as the cartridge remanufacturers? If so, why deny
standing to Static? Section four of the Clayton Act grants an antitrust suit
to “anyone who shall be injured in his business or property” by an antitrust
violation. 15 U.S.C. §15.
DEALING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1996
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
TALK AMERICA, INC. V. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE CO.
131 S.Ct. 2254 (2011)
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
In these cases, we consider whether an incumbent provider of local
telephone service must make certain transmission facilities available to
competitors at cost-based rates. The Federal Communications Commission
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(FCC or Commission) as amicus curiae contends that its regulations require
the incumbent provider to do so if the facilities are to be used for
interconnection: to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network with
the competitor’s network for the mutual exchange of traffic. We defer to the
Commission’s views and reverse the judgment below.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), 110 Stat. 56, imposed
a number of duties on incumbent providers of local telephone service in
order to facilitate market entry by competitors. AT & T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). The incumbent local ex-change
carriers (LECs) owned the local exchange networks: the physical equipment
necessary to receive, properly route, and deliver phone calls among
customers. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 490 (2002).
Before the 1996 Act, a new, competitive LEC could not compete with an
incumbent carrier without basically replicating the incumbent’s entire
existing network.
The 1996 Act addressed that barrier to market entry by requiring
incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitive LECs in several
ways, two of which are relevant here. First, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) requires
incumbent LECs to lease “on an unbundled basis”— i.e., a la carte—
network elements specified by the Commission. This makes it easier for a
competitor to create its own network without having to build every element
from scratch. In identifying which network elements must be available for
unbundled lease under § 251(c)(3), the Commission is required to consider
whether access is “necessary” and whether failing to provide access would
“impair” a competitor’s provision of service. § 251(d)(2). Second, §
251(c)(2) mandates that incumbent LECs “provide ... interconnection”
between their networks and competitive LECs’ facilities. This ensures that
customers on a competitor’s network can call customers on the incumbent’s
network, and vice versa. The interconnection duty is independent of the
unbundling rules and not subject to impairment analysis. It is undisputed
that both un-bundled network elements and interconnection must be
provided at cost-based rates.
These cases concern incumbent LECs’ obligation to share existing
“entrance facilities” with competitive LECs. Entrance facilities are the
transmission facilities (typically wires or cables) that connect competitive
LECs’ networks with incumbent LECs’ networks. The FCC recently
adopted a regulation specifying that entrance facilities are not among the
network elements that § 251(c)(3) requires incumbents to lease to
competitors on an unbundled basis at cost-based rates. See 47 CFR §
51.319(e)(2)(i) (2005).
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The specific issue here is whether respondent, Michigan Bell Telephone
Company d/b/a AT & T Michigan (“AT&T”), must lease existing entrance
facilities to competitive LECs at cost-based rates. The FCC interprets its
regulations to require AT & T to do so for the purpose of interconnection.
We begin by reviewing the Commission’s recent actions regarding entrance
facilities and then explain the particular dispute that is before us today.
…
[In 2003, the FCC revised prior orders by stating that: (1) incumbent
LECs are not obligated to provide cost-based unbundled access to entrance
facilities under § 251(c)(3), and (2) entrance facilities are not subject to the
unbundling requirement because they are not network elements.]
[But in 2005 the D.C. Circuit questioned the Commission’s
determination that entrance facilities are not network elements under §
251(c)(3) and] the Commission responded. See Triennial Review Remand
Order ¶¶ 136–141. The Commission re-treated from its view that entrance
facilities are not network elements but adhered to its previous position that
cost-based unbundled access to them need not be provided under §
251(c)(3). Treating entrance facilities as network elements, the Commission
concluded that competitive LECs are not impaired without access to them.
Ibid. The Commission again emphasized that it “d[id] not alter the right of
competitive LECs to obtain interconnection facilities pursuant to section
251(c)(2).”
In the wake of the Triennial Review Remand Order, AT & T notified
competitive LECs that it would no longer provide entrance facilities at costbased rates for either backhauling or interconnection, but would instead
charge higher rates. Competitive LECs complained to the Michigan Public
Service Commission (PSC) that AT & T was unlawfully abrogating their
right to cost-based interconnection under § 251(c)(2). The Michigan PSC
agreed with the competitive LECs and ordered AT & T to continue
providing entrance facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates.
AT & T challenged the Michigan PSC’s ruling in the District Court,
which, relying on the Triennial Review Remand Order, ruled in AT & T’s
favor. The Michigan PSC and several competitive LECs, including
petitioner Talk America, Inc., appealed….
Petitioners contend that AT & T must lease its existing entrance
facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates. We agree.
No statute or regulation squarely addresses whether an incumbent LEC
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must provide access to entrance facilities at cost-based rates as part of its
interconnection duty under § 251(c)(2).
AT & T contends that [§ 251(c)(2)] makes clear that an incumbent LEC
need not provide access to any facilities—much less entrance facilities—to
provide interconnection. The company points out that § 251(c)(2) does not
mention incumbent LECs’ facilities, but rather mandates only that
incumbent LECs provide interconnection “for the facilities and equipment
of any [competing] carrier.” In contrast, AT & T notes, § 251(c)(3) requires
that incumbent LECs provide unbundled “access to [their] network
elements.”
We do not find the statute so clear. Although § 251(c)(2) does not
expressly require that incumbent LECs lease facilities to provide
interconnection, it also does not expressly excuse them from doing so. The
statute says nothing about what an incumbent LEC must do to “provide ...
interconnection.” § 251(c)(2). “[T]he facilities and equipment of any
[competing] carrier” identifies the equipment that an incumbent LEC must
allow to interconnect, but it does not specify what the incumbent LEC must
do to make the interconnection possible.
In the absence of any unambiguous statute or regulation, we turn to the
FCC’s interpretation of its regulations in its amicus brief. …[W]e defer to
an agency’s interpretation of its regulations, even in a legal brief, unless the
interpretation is “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation [s]’
” or there is any other “ ‘reason to suspect that the interpretation does not
reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question.’”
The Commission contends that its regulations require AT & T to
provide access at cost-based rates to its existing entrance facilities for the
purpose of interconnection. The Commission’s interpretation proceeds in
three steps. First, an incumbent LEC must lease “technically feasible”
facilities for interconnection. Second, entrance facilities are among the
facilities that an incumbent must make available for interconnection, if
technically feasible. Third, it is technically feasible to provide access to the
particular entrance facilities at issue in these cases.
The Commission first contends that an incumbent LEC must lease, at
cost-based rates, any requested facilities for obtaining interconnection with
the incumbent LEC’s network, unless it is technically infeasible to do so.
Section 251(c)(2) mandates that an incumbent LEC provide
interconnection, at cost-based rates, “at any technically feasible point within
the carrier’s network.” The FCC has long construed § 251(c)(2) to require
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incumbent LECs to provide, at cost-based rates, “any technically feasible
method of obtaining interconnection ... at a particular point.” 47 CFR §
51.321(a) (2010).
The requirement in § 51.321(a) to provide a “method of obtaining
interconnection,” the Commission argues, encompasses a duty to lease an
existing facility to a competing LEC. When the Commission originally
promulgated § 51.321(a), it explained that incumbent LECs would be
required to “adapt their facilities to interconnection” and to “accept the
novel use of, and modification to, [their] network facilities.”…
Next, the Commission contends that existing entrance facilities are
among the facilities that an incumbent LEC must lease for interconnection.
According to the FCC, the Triennial Review Remand Order adopted a
regulatory definition that reestablished that entrance facilities are part of an
incumbent LEC’s network….
Finally, the FCC contends that providing access to the entrance facilities
here for interconnection purposes is technically feasible. Under the
Commission’s regulations, an incumbent LEC bears the burden of showing
that a requested method or point of interconnection is technically infeasible.
See 47 CFR §§ 51.305(e), 51.321(d); see also §§ 51.305(d), 51.321(c)
(previously successful interconnection is “substantial evidence” of technical
feasibility). AT & T does not dispute technical feasibility here.
The FCC’s interpretation is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation[s].” … Indeed, the Commission’s view on this question is
more than reasonable; it is certainly not plainly erroneous. The Triennial
Review Remand Order responded to the D.C. Circuit’s decision questioning
the Commission’s earlier finding that entrance facilities are not network
elements. It revised the definition of dedicated transport—a type of network
element—to include entrance facilities….
Second, we are not persuaded by AT & T’s argument that the
Commission’s views conflict with the definition of interconnection in §
51.5. That regulation provides: “Interconnection is the linking of two
networks for the mutual exchange of traffic. This term does not include the
transport and termination of traffic.” AT & T focuses on the definition’s
exclusion of “transport and termination of traffic.” An entrance facility is a
transport facility, AT & T argues, and it makes no sense to require an
incumbent LEC to furnish a transport facility for interconnection when the
definition of interconnection expressly excludes transport.
We think AT & T reads too much into the exclusion of “transport.” The
regulation cannot possibly mean that no transport can occur across an
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interconnection facility, as that would directly conflict with the statutory
language. See § 251(c)(2) (requiring “interconnection ... for the
transmission and routing of [local] telephone exchange service”).
The better reading of the regulation is that it merely reflects that the
“transport and termination of traffic” is subject to different regulatory
treatment than interconnection. Compensation for transport and
termination—that is, for delivering local telephone calls placed by another
carrier’s customer—is governed by separate statutory provisions and
regulations. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(5), 252(d)(2); 47 CFR § 51.701. The
Commission explains that a competitive LEC typically pays one fee for
interconnection—“just for having the link”—and then an additional fee for
the transport and termination of telephone calls. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28; see
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3, n. 1. Entrance facilities, at
least when used for the mutual exchange of traffic, seem to us to fall
comfortably within the definition of interconnection. See 597 F.3d, at 388
(Sutton, J., dissenting) (noting that entrance facilities are “designed for the
very purpose of linking two carriers’ networks” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In sum, the Commission’s interpretation of its regulations is neither
plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulatory text. Contrary to AT
& T’s assertion, there is no danger that deferring to the Commission would
effectively “permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation,
to create de facto a new regulation.” Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
It is so ordered.
[a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia is omitted; Justice Kagan did not
participate]
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. As discussed earlier, in its Trinko decision the Supreme Court held the
the antitrust laws compel dealing with a rival only in extreme situations.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c), goes much
further. Under it an incumbent carrier must provide interconnection to all
competitive carriers. The incumbent may charge market-based rates unless
the FCC determines that this price would impair the competitor’s ability to
offer its service to customers; then it must charge cost-based rates.
Do these provisions create a more efficient and competitive
teecommunications market that benefit consumers? If a dominant
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incumbent is obligated to license its intercommunication equipment to
smaller, local firms at a cost-based price, this will open the market to more
firms, creating more “competition.” But will this result in higher output and
lower prices? Further, what incentive does a dominant firm have to invest in
innovation or more efficient business practices when smaller firms will be
able to benefit without contributing to the investment cost?
The
interpretation of the antitrust laws in Trinko and the interconnection
requirements in the 1996 Telecommunications Act reflect radically different
approaches to this problem, do they not?
“NET NEUTRALITY” AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS
IMPOSED
BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, V. FCC
717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, adopted under
the mandate of § 616 of the Communications Act of 1934 and virtually
duplicating its language, bar a multichannel video programming distributor
(“MVPD”) such as a cable company from discriminating against
unaffiliated programming networks in decisions about content distribution.
More specifically, the regulations bar such conduct when the effect of the
discrimination is to “unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated
video programming vendor to compete fairly.” 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c); see
also 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3). Tennis Channel, a sports programming network
and intervenor in this suit, filed a complaint against petitioner Comcast
Cable, an MVPD, alleging that Comcast violated § 616 and the
Commission's regulations by refusing to broadcast Tennis as widely (i.e.,
via the same relatively low-priced “tier”) as it did its own affiliated sports
programming networks, Golf Channel and Versus. (Versus is now known as
NBC Sports Network and was originally called Outdoor Life Network; for
consistency with the order under review, we refer to it as “Versus.”) An
administrative law judge ruled against Comcast, ordering that it provide
Tennis carriage equal to what it affords Golf and Versus, and the
Commission affirmed. See Tennis Channel, Inc. v. Comcast Cable
Commc'ns, LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 8508
(July 24, 2012) (“ Order”).
Comcast poses a number of issues as to the meaning of § 616, including
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an argument that the Commission reads it so broadly as to violate Comcast's
free speech rights under the First Amendment. We need not reach those
issues, as Comcast prevails with its third set of arguments—that even under
the Commission's interpretation of § 616 (the correctness of which we
assume for purposes of this decision), the Commission has failed to identify
adequate evidence of unlawful discrimination.
Comcast … argued that the Commission could not lawfully find
discrimination because Tennis offered no evidence that its rejected proposal
would have afforded Comcast any benefit. If this is correct, as we conclude
below, the Commission has nothing to refute Comcast's contention that its
rejection of Tennis's proposal was simply “a straight up financial analysis,”
as one of its executives put it. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 300.
***
Comcast, the largest MVPD in the United States, offers cable television
programming to its subscribers in several different distribution “tiers,” or
packages of programming services, at different prices. Since Versus's and
Golf's launches in 1995, Comcast—which originally had a minority interest
in the two networks, and now has 100% ownership—has generally carried
the networks on its most broadly distributed tiers, Expanded Basic or the
digital counterpart Digital Starter. Order ¶ 12; J.A. 1223–24.
Tennis Channel, launched in 2003, initially sought distribution of its
content on Comcast's less broadly distributed sports tier, a package of 10 to
15 sports networks that Comcast's subscribers can access for an extra $5 to
$8 per month. In 2005, Tennis entered a carriage contract that gave the
Comcast the “right to carry” Tennis “on any ... tier of service,” subject to
exclusions irrelevant here. Comcast in fact placed Tennis on the sports tier.
In 2009, however, Tennis approached Comcast with proposals that
Comcast reposition Tennis onto a tier with broader distribution. Order ¶¶
12, 33. Tennis's proposed agreement called for Comcast to pay Tennis for
distribution on a per-subscriber basis. Tennis provided a detailed analysis—
which is sealed in this proceeding—of what Comcast would likely pay for
that broader distribution; even with the discounts that Tennis offered, the
amounts are substantial. Neither the analysis provided at the time, nor
testimony received in this litigation, made (much less substantiated)
projections of any resulting increase in revenue for Comcast, let alone
revenue sufficient to offset the increased fees.
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Comcast entertained the proposal, checking with “division and system
employees to gauge local and subscriber interest.” J.A. 402. After those
consultations, and based on previous analyses of interest in Tennis,
Comcast rejected the proposal in June 2009. Tennis then filed its complaint
with the Commission in January 2010, which led to the order now under
review. By way of remedy, the ALJ ordered, and the Commission affirmed,
that Comcast must “carry [Tennis] on the same distribution tier, reaching
the same number of subscribers, as it does [Golf] and Versus.” Order ¶ 92.
The parties agree that Comcast distributes the content of affiliates Golf
and Versus more broadly than it does that of Tennis. The question is
whether that difference violates § 616 and the implementing regulations.
There is also no dispute that the statute prohibits only discrimination based
on affiliation. Thus, if the MVPD treats vendors differently based on a
reasonable business purpose (obviously excluding any purpose to
illegitimately hobble the competition from Tennis), there is no violation.
The Commission has so interpreted the statute, Mid–Atlantic Sports
Network v. Time Warner Cable Inc., 25 FCC Rcd. 18099, ¶ 22 (2010), and
the Commission's attorney conceded as much at oral argument, see Oral
Arg. Tr. at 24–25; see also TCR Sports Broad. Holding L.L.P. v. FCC, 679
F.3d 269, 274–77 (4th Cir.2012) (discussing the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for an MVPD's differential treatment of a nonaffiliated network).
In contrast with the detailed, concrete explanation of Comcast's
additional costs under the proposed tier change, Tennis showed no
corresponding benefits that would accrue to Comcast by its accepting the
change. Testimony from one of Comcast's executives identifies some of the
factors it considers when deciding whether to move a channel to broader
distribution:
In deciding whether to carry a network and at what cost, Comcast Cable
must balance the costs and benefits associated with a wide range of
factors, including: the amount of the licensing fees (which is generally
the most important factor); the nature of the programming content
involved; the intensity and size of the fan base for that content; the level
of service sought by the network; the network's carriage on other
MVPDs; the extent of [most favored nation]2 protection provided; the
A “most favored nation” provision grants the distributor “the right to be
offered any more favorable rates, terms, or conditions subsequently offered or
2
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term of the contract sought; and a variety of other operational issues.
But neither Tennis nor the Commission offers such an analysis on either
a qualitative or a quantitative basis. Instead, the best the Commission offers,
both in the Order and at oral argument, is that Tennis charges less per
“rating point” than does either Golf or Versus. Order ¶ 78 n. 243; Oral Arg.
Tr. at 25–29. But those differentials are not affirmative evidence that
acceptance of Tennis's 2009 proposal could have offered Comcast any net
gain. Even if we were to assume arguendo that low charges per ratings point
are the be-all and the end-all of assigning a network to a broadly accessible
tier (and the record does not support such an assumption), the cost-perratings-point evidence would at most show that (by this particular criterion)
Tennis's gross cost is not as high as that of either Golf or Versus. It does not
show any affirmative net benefit. As to the assumption about cost per
ratings point, the sealed record suggests (consistent with Comcast's
evidence about the factors guiding its tier placement decisions) that a very
high price per rating point is by no means an absolute barrier to placement
in a broadly available tier. J.A. 51, 1112.
A rather obvious type of proof would have been expert evidence to the
effect that X number of subscribers would switch to Comcast if it carried
Tennis more broadly, or that Y number would leave Comcast in the absence
of broader carriage, or a combination of the two, such that Comcast would
recoup the proposed increment in cost. There is no such evidence.…
Not only does the record lack affirmative evidence along these lines,
there is evidence that no such benefits exist. [Evidence that no benefits for
Comcast exist can be seen in a] natural experiment conducted in Comcast's
southern division. There Comcast had in 2007 or 2008 acquired a
distribution network from another MVPD that had distributed Tennis more
broadly than did Comcast. When Comcast repositioned Tennis to the sports
tier (a “negative repo” in MVPD lingo), thereby making it available to
Comcast's general subscribers only for an additional fee, not one customer
complained about the change.
When we asked at oral argument about the absence of evidence of
benefit to Comcast from the proposed tier change, Commission counsel
granted by a network to another distributor.” Of course the record is very strong
on the proposed increment in licensing fees, in itself a clear negative. The question
is whether the other factors, and perhaps ones unmentioned by Comcast, establish
reason to expect a net benefit.
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pointed not to any such evidence but to the ALJ's remedy (affirmed by the
Commission), which gave Comcast the alternative of narrowing the
exposure of Golf and Versus (rather than broadening that of Tennis). Such a
change was the Commission's alternative remedy for bringing the three
networks to tiering parity. But the discriminatory act alleged by the
Commission was Comcast's refusal to broaden its distribution of Tennis, not
a refusal to narrow its distribution of Golf and Versus. The latter may make
complete sense in terms of providing an evenhanded remedy. But evidence
that such a change would have afforded Comcast a net benefit—for
example, by generating incremental sports tier fees exceeding incremental
losses from the removal of Golf and Versus from lower priced tiers—would
in itself have little bearing on the lawfulness of Comcast's rejection of
Tennis's actual proposal to extend distribution of the latter's content....
Without showing any benefit for Comcast from incurring the additional
fees for assigning Tennis a more advantageous tier, the Commission has not
provided evidence that Comcast discriminated against Tennis on the basis
of affiliation. And while the Commission describes at length the
“substantial evidence” that supports a finding that the discrimination is
based on affiliation, Resp'ts' Br. at 25–31, none of that evidence establishes
benefits that Comcast would receive if it distributed Tennis more broadly.
On this issue the Commission has pointed to no evidence, and therefore
obviously not to substantial evidence. See Guardian Moving & Storage Co.,
Inc. v. ICC, 952 F.2d 1428, 1433 (D.C.Cir.1992).
***
The petition is therefore
Granted.
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring:
...
As the Court's opinion explains, the FCC erred in concluding that
Comcast discriminated against the Tennis Channel on the basis of
affiliation. I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to point out
that the FCC also erred in a more fundamental way. Section 616's use of the
phrase “unreasonably restrain”—an antitrust term of art—establishes that
the statute applies only to discrimination that amounts to an unreasonable
restraint under antitrust law. Vertical integration and vertical contracts—for
example, between a video programming distributor and a video
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programming network—become potentially problematic under antitrust law
only when a company has market power in the relevant market. It follows
that Section 616 applies only when a video programming distributor
possesses market power. But Comcast does not have market power in the
national video programming distribution market, the relevant market
analyzed by the FCC in this case. Therefore, as I will explain in Part I of
this opinion, Section 616 does not apply here.
Applying Section 616 to a video programming distributor that lacks
market power not only contravenes the terms of the statute, but also violates
the First Amendment as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. As I
will explain in Part II of this opinion, the canon of constitutional avoidance
thus strongly reinforces the conclusion that Section 616 applies only when a
video programming distributor possesses market power.
I
Section 616 of the Communications Act requires the FCC to:
prevent a multichannel video programming distributor from
engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably restrain the
ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly by
discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis of
affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors in the selection, terms, or
conditions for carriage of video programming provided by such vendors.
47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (emphasis added); see 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c). The
statutory text establishes that a Section 616 violation has two elements.
First, the video programming distributor must have discriminated against an
unaffiliated video programming network on the basis of affiliation. Second,
the video programming distributor's discrimination must have
“unreasonably restrain[ed]” the unaffiliated network's ability “to compete
fairly.”
Congress enacted Section 616 (over the veto of President George H.W.
Bush) as part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, known as the Cable Act. The Cable Act included numerous
provisions designed to curb abuses of cable operators' bottleneck monopoly
power and to promote competition in the cable television industry. When
the Act was passed, however, the video programming market looked quite
different than it looks today. At the time, most households subscribed to
cable in order to view television programming. And as Congress noted,
“most cable television subscribers [had] no opportunity to select between

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 75
Oct. 2013

competing cable systems.” Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102–385, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1460,
1460 (1992). Congress decided to proactively counteract the bottleneck
monopoly power that cable operators possessed in many local markets.
The Cable Act employs a variety of tools to advance competition. Some
provisions directly prohibit practices that Congress viewed as
anticompetitive in the market at the time. For example, the Act prohibits
local franchising authorities from granting exclusive franchises to cable
operators. See id. § 7(a), 106 Stat. at 1483. Similarly, the Act's “must-carry”
provisions require cable operators to carry a specified number of local
broadcast stations. See id. § 4, 106 Stat. at 1471.
In other parts of the Act, Congress borrowed from antitrust law,
authorizing the FCC to regulate cable operators' conduct in accordance with
antitrust principles. For example, the Act requires the FCC, when
prescribing limits on the number of cable subscribers or affiliated channels,
to take account of “the nature and market power of the local franchise.” See
id. § 11(c), 106 Stat. at 1488. Similarly, the Act allows rate regulation only
of those cable systems that are not subject to effective competition. See id. §
3, 106 Stat. at 1464.
The provision at issue in this case, Section 616, incorporates traditional
antitrust principles. Section 616 does not categorically forbid a video
programming distributor from extending preferential treatment to affiliated
video programming networks or lesser treatment to unaffiliated video
programming networks. Rather, to violate Section 616, a video
programming distributor must discriminate among video programming
networks on the basis of affiliation, and the discrimination must
“unreasonably restrain” an unaffiliated network's ability to compete
fairly. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3).
The phrase “unreasonably restrain” is of course a longstanding term of
art in antitrust law. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)(“[T]he Court has repeated time and again
that § 1 outlaws only unreasonable restraints.”).....
When a statute uses a term of art from a specific field of law, we
presume that Congress adopted “the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” FAA
v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 (2012)...; ANTONIN SCALIA &
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BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 73 (2012) (where “a word is obviously transplanted from
another legal source, ... it brings the old soil with it”) (internal quotation
mark omitted); cf. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S.Ct.
1003, 1015(2013) (reading statute “in light of our national policy favoring
competition”).
From the “term of art” canon and Section 616's use of the antitrust term
of art “unreasonably restrain,” it follows that Section 616 incorporates
antitrust principles governing unreasonable restraints.
So what does antitrust law tell us? In antitrust law, certain activities are
considered per se anticompetitive. Otherwise, however, conduct generally
can be considered unreasonable only if a firm, or multiple firms acting in
concert, have market power. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551
U.S. at 885–86.
This case involves vertical integration and vertical contracts. Beginning
in the 1970s (well before the 1992 Cable Act), the Supreme Court has
recognized the legitimacy of vertical integration and vertical contracts by
firms without market power..... See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical
Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60ANTITRUST
L.J. 67, 76 (1991) (“Antitrust law is a bar to the use of vertical restraints
only in markets in which there is no apparent interbrand competition to
protect consumers from a potentially welfare-decreasing restraint on
intrabrand competition.”); 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 756a, at 9 (3d ed.2008) (vertical
integration “is either competitively neutral or affirmatively desirable
because it promotes efficiency”)....
Not surprisingly given its procompetitive characteristics, vertical
integration and vertical contracts are common and accepted practices in the
American economy: Apple's iPhones contain integrated hardware and
software, Dunkin' Donuts sells Dunkin' Donuts coffee, Ford produces
radiators for its cars, McDonalds sells Big Macs, Nike stores are stocked
with Nike shoes, Netflix owns “House of Cards,” and so on. As Professors
Areeda and Hovenkamp have explained, vertical integration “is ubiquitous
in our economy and virtually never poses a threat to competition when
undertaken unilaterally and in competitive markets.” 3B AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 755c, at 6.
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Following the lead of the Supreme Court and influential academic
literature on which the Supreme Court has relied in the antitrust field, this
Court's case law has stated that vertical integration and vertical contracts are
procompetitive, at least absent market power. See Cablevision Systems
Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d 695, 721 (D.C.Cir.2011) (vertical integration is
“not always pernicious and, depending on market conditions, may actually
be procompetitive”); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d
831, 840 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“We began by emphasizing that vertical
integration creates efficiencies for consumers.”); Tenneco Gas v.
FERC, 969 F.2d 1187, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“[A]dvantages a pipeline gives
its affiliate are improper only to the extent that they flow from the pipeline's
anti-competitive market power. Otherwise vertical integration produces
permissible efficiencies that cannot by themselves be considered uses of
monopoly power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cablevision
Systems Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306, 1325 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“At least unless a company possesses market power in the
relevant market, vertical integration and exclusive vertical contracts are not
anti-competitive; on the contrary, such arrangements are ‘presumptively
procompetitive.’ ”) (quoting 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 1803, at 100 (2d ed.2005)).
Now back to Section 616: Because Section 616 incorporates antitrust
principles and because antitrust law holds that vertical integration and
vertical contracts are potentially problematic only when a firm has market
power in the relevant market, it follows that Section 616 applies only when
a video programming distributor has market power in the relevant
market. Section 616 thus does not bar vertical integration or vertical
contracts that favor affiliated video programming networks, absent a
showing that the video programming distributor at least has market power
in the relevant market. To conclude otherwise would require us to depart
from the established meaning of the term of art “unreasonably restrain” that
Section 616 uses. Moreover, to conclude otherwise would require us to
believe that Congress intended to thwart procompetitive practices. It would
of course make little sense to attribute that motivation to Congress.
How, then, did the FCC reach the opposite conclusion in this case? The
short answer is that the FCC badly misread the statute. Contrary to the plain
language of Section 616, the FCC stated that the term “unreasonably”
modified “discriminating” not “restrain”—even though Section 616 says it
applies only to discriminatory conduct that “unreasonably restrain[s]” the
ability of a competitor to compete fairly. See Order¶¶ 43, 85–86. Because
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the FCC did not read Section 616 as written, it did not recognize the
antitrust term of art “unreasonably restrain” that is apparent on the face of
the statute. That erroneous reading of the text, in turn, led the FCC to
mistakenly focus on the effects of Comcast's conduct on a competitor (the
Tennis Channel) rather than on overall competition. See id. ¶¶ 83–85. That
was a mistake because the goal of antitrust law (and thus of Section 616) is
to promote consumer welfare by protecting competition, not by protecting
individual competitors. See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
128, 135 (1998) (Sherman Act plaintiff “must allege and prove harm, not
just to a single competitor, but to the competitive process, i.e., to
competition itself”); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458
(1993) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from
the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the
market.”); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (“The antitrust laws ... were enacted for the protection
of competition, not competitors.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 755c, at 6
(“[E]ven competitively harmless vertical integration can injure rivals or
vertically related firms, but such injuries are not the concern of the antitrust
laws.”).
It is true that Section 616 references discrimination against competitors.
But again, the statute does not ban such discrimination outright. It bans
discrimination that unreasonably restrains a competitor from competing
fairly. By using the phrase “unreasonably restrain,” the statute incorporates
an antitrust term of art, and that term of art requires that the discrimination
in question hinder overall competition, not just competitors.
In sum, Section 616 targets instances of preferential program carriage
that are anticompetitive under the antitrust laws. Section 616 thus may
apply only when a video programming distributor possesses market power
in the relevant market. Comcast has only about a 24% market share in the
national video programming distribution market; it does not possess market
power in the market considered by the FCC in this case. See Order ¶
87. Therefore, the FCC erred in finding that Comcast violated Section 616.
II
To the extent there is uncertainty about whether the phrase
“unreasonably restrain” in Section 616 means that the statute applies only in
cases of market power or instead may have a broader reach, we must
construe the statute to avoid “serious constitutional concerns.” Edward J.
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DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 577 (1988); see also Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001). That canon strongly supports limiting Section 616 to cases of
market power. Applying Section 616 to a video programming distributor
that lacks market power would raise serious First Amendment questions
under the Supreme Court's case law....
To begin with, the Supreme Court has squarely held that a video
programming distributor such as Comcast both engages in and transmits
speech, and is therefore protected by the First Amendment. See Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994). Just as a
newspaper exercises editorial discretion over which articles to run, a video
programming distributor exercises editorial discretion over which video
programming networks to carry and at what level of carriage.
It is true that, under the Supreme Court's precedents, Section 616's
impact on a cable operator's editorial control is content-neutral and thus
triggers only intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. See id. at 642–
43. But the Supreme Court's case law applying intermediate scrutiny in this
context provides that the Government may interfere with a video
programming distributor's editorial discretion only when the video
programming distributor possesses market power in the relevant market.
In its 1994 decision in Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Cable Act's must-carry provisions might satisfy intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny, but the Court rested that conclusion on “special
characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power
exercised by cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the
viability of broadcast television.” Id. at 661. When a cable operator has
bottleneck power, the Court explained, it can “silence the voice of
competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.” Id. at 656. In
subsequently upholding the must-carry provisions, the Court reiterated that
cable's bottleneck monopoly power was critical to the First Amendment
calculus. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 197–
207 (1997)(controlling opinion of Kennedy, J.). The Court stated that “cable
operators possess[ed] a local monopoly over cable households,” with only
one percent of communities being served by more than one cable
operator.Id. at 197.
…
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[But since this Court decided Turner Broadcasting], the video
programming distribution market has changed dramatically, especially with
the rapid growth of satellite and Internet providers. This Court has
previously described the massive transformation, explaining that cable
operators “no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that
concerned the Congress in 1992.” Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 8
(D.C.Cir.2009); see also Cablevision Systems Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306,
1324 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“This radically changed
and highly competitive marketplace—where no cable operator exercises
market power in the downstream or upstream markets and no national video
programming network is so powerful as to dominate the programming
market—completely eviscerates the justification we relied on in Time
Warner for the ban on exclusive contracts.”); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical
Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON
REG. 171, 229 (2002) (“It thus appears that the national market for MVPDs
is already too unconcentrated to support the conclusion that vertical
integration could have any anti-competitive effects.”).
In today's highly competitive market, neither Comcast nor any other
video programming distributor possesses market power in the national
video programming distribution market....
In light of the Supreme Court's precedents interpreting the First
Amendment and the massive changes to the video programming distribution
market over the last two decades, the FCC's interference with Comcast's
editorial discretion cannot stand. In restricting the editorial discretion of
video programming distributors, the FCC cannot continue to implement a
regulatory model premised on a 1990s snapshot of the cable market.
The Supreme Court's precedents amply demonstrate that the FCC's
interpretation of Section 616 violates the First Amendment. At a minimum,
the Supreme Court's precedents raise serious First Amendment questions
about the FCC's interpretation of Section 616. Under the constitutional
avoidance canon, those serious constitutional questions require that we
construe Section 616 to apply only when a video programming distributor
possesses market power....
TIME WARNER CABLE, INC. V. FCC
2013 WL 4733668 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2013)
RAGGI, Circuit Judge.
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Time Warner Cable Inc. (“Time Warner”) and the National Cable &
Telecommunications Association (“NCTA” and, collectively with Time
Warner, the “Cable Companies”) petition for review of an August 1, 2011
order of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or
“Commission”). …. Section 616(a)(3) and (5) and that part of the 2011
FCC Order establishing the standard for demonstrating a prima facie
violation of these statutory provisions (collectively, the “program carriage
regime”) are intended to curb anticompetitive behavior by limiting the
circumstances under which a distributor of video programming can
discriminate against unaffiliated networks that provide such programming.
The Cable Companies contend that, on its face, the program carriage regime
violates their First Amendment right to free speech....
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject the Cable Companies'
First Amendment challenge to the program carriage regime . . . .
I. Background
A. The Video Programming Industry
[T]he video programming industry includes video programming
vendors, multichannel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), and
online video distributors (“OVDs”)]. Video programming vendors are
primarily programming networks, such as ESPN, Bravo, and CNN, which
create or acquire video programming, such as television shows and movies,
and which contract with MVPDs and OVDs to distribute that programming
to consumers. MVPDs and OVDs are services that transmit video
programming to subscribers for viewing on televisions, computers, and
other electronic devices. MVPDs and OVDs generally do not alter the
programming that they transmit; rather, once an MVPD or OVD acquires
programming from networks, it functions as a “conduit for the speech of
others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited basis to [consumers].”
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994) (“Turner I ”).
MVPDs include (1) cable operators, such as Time Warner and Comcast
Corporation (“Comcast”), which transmit programming over physical cable
systems; (2) direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) providers, such as DISH
Network and DIRECTV, which transmit programming via direct-to-home
satellite; and (3) telephone companies, such as AT & T and Verizon, which
transmit programming via fiber-optic cable. While MVPDs primarily
transmit programming to televisions, increasingly, they also offer access to
their programming through the Internet. MVPDs sometimes acquire
ownership interests in the networks from which they obtain video
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programming, and vice versa. Such networks are deemed “affiliated” with
MVPDs, whereas networks without any shared ownership interests are
deemed “unaffiliated.” The “geographic footprint [ ]” of an MVPD varies
based on the type and size of the MVPD. Cable operators, for instance,
operate in “discrete geographic areas defined by the boundaries of their
individual systems,” and “[n]o cable operator provides nationwide coverage
or statewide coverage.” Telephone companies are similarly limited by their
physical systems. By contrast, DBS providers have “national footprints,”
offering “service to most of the land area and population of the United
States.”
OVDs, like Hulu and Netflix, are relatively new services that transmit
video programming to consumers via broadband Internet for viewing on
television and other electronic devices. OVDs may offer programming for
free, by subscription, on a rental basis, or for sale. “[A]n OVD's market
generally covers the entire national broadband footprint.”
Two markets in the video programming industry are relevant to this
case. The first, which we will refer to as the “video programming market,”
is the market in which programming networks and other video
programming vendors compete with each other to have MVPDs and OVDs
carry their video programming. The second market, which we will refer to
as the “MVPD market,” consists of MVPDs and, to a lesser extent, OVDs
competing to deliver video programming to consumers.
B. The Cable Act
[In 1992, Congress enacted the Cable Act to regulate the video
programming industry. During this time, cable operators controlled 95% of
the MVPD market because other MVPD systems like DBS, fiber-optic
telephone, and OVDs either did not pose a significant competitive threat to
cable operators or did not yet exist.]. Cable operators also generally did not
compete against one another in any given locality… Thus, the country was
effectively divided into numerous local cable monopolies, with few
consumers having a choice of MVPDs.
[C]able operators [also] exercised “bottleneck” control, a power that
allowed them to prevent certain programming networks from reaching
consumers in particular geographic areas. It is the “physical connection
between the [subscriber's] television set and the cable network” that affords
cable operators this power to “silence the voice” of a particular network
“with a mere flick of the switch.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656 (observing that
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“simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech,
a cable operator [could] prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to
programming it [chose] to exclude”); see generally 3B P. Areeda & H.
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 771a, 772a (3d ed.2008) (discussing
bottleneck control and essential facilities doctrine in antitrust context).
Concerns about cable operators' anticompetitive market power informed
Congress's enactment of the Cable Act. [T]he Act sought to promote the
availability to the public of diverse views through cable television, to
protect consumer interests where cable operators were not subject to
effective competition, and to ensure that cable operators did not have undue
market power vis-à-vis programming networks and consumers. Toward
these ends, the Cable Act imposed various restrictions on cable operators
and other MVPDs and directed the FCC to establish further regulations. The
focus of this appeal is certain statutory restrictions on MVPDs dealings with
programming networks and the FCC regulations promulgated thereunder,
namely, the program carriage regime…
C. The Program Carriage Regime and Standstill Rule
1. Section 616(a)(3) and (5)
[T]he Communications Act directs the FCC to “establish regulations
governing program carriage agreements and related practices between cable
operators or other [MVPDs] and video programming vendors.” 47 U.S.C. §
536(a). Section 616(a)(3) specifies that such regulations shall [prevent an
MVPD from “engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably
restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete
fairly by discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis of
affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors.”].
Congress enacted these provisions to prevent cable operators from using
their market power to take unfair advantage of unaffiliated programming
networks. As the Senate and House Reports indicate, Congress was
concerned that cable operators were leveraging “their market power derived
from their de facto exclusive franchises and lack of local competition” to
require networks to give them “an exclusive right to carry the programming,
a financial interest, or some other added consideration as a condition of
carriage on the cable system.” … Congress remained concerned that “in
certain instances” a cable operator would be able to “abuse its locallyderived market power to the detriment of programmers.”
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This concern was exacerbated by pervasive vertical integration in the
video programming industry. “Vertical integration occurs when a firm
provides for itself some input that it might otherwise purchase on the
market.” Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 755a. “A vertically integrated cable
company is a company that owns both the programming and the distribution
system.” S.Rep. No. 102–92, at 24–25, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1157–58. In 1992, when the Cable Act was enacted, 39 of the 68 national
programming networks, or approximately 57%, were vertically integrated
with cable operators. This vertical integration provided cable operators with
the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated networks, for example, by
giving an affiliated network a more desirable channel position than an
unaffiliated network or by refusing to carry an unaffiliated network
altogether. Indeed, the Senate Report noted hearing testimony that stated as
much:
Because of the trend toward vertical integration, cable operators now
have a clear vested interest in the competitive success of some of the
programming services seeking access through their conduit. You don't
need a Ph.D. in Economics to figure out that the guy who controls a
monopoly conduit is in a unique position to control the flow of
programming traffic to the advantage of the program services in which
he has an equity investment and/or in which he is selling advertising
availabilities, and to the disadvantage of those services ... in which he
does not have an equity position.
S.Rep. No. 102–92, at 25–26, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1158–
59 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶
756b (stating that vertically-integrated monopolist “at one stage of the
production-distribution process may carry with it the power to affect
competition in earlier and later stages”).
On the other hand, Congress recognized that vertical integration could
sometimes promote competition. The Senate Report cited hearing testimony
recounting how vertical integration had allowed cable operators to
“stimulate[ ] the development of programming that was necessary to flesh
out the promise of cable ... when nobody else was really willing to step up
and put up the money.” S.Rep. No. 102–92, at 27, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1160; see also Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 756b (“[V]ertical
integration by a monopolist may or may not have desirable or adverse
consequences on economic performance.”).
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Given these mixed views on the competitive impact of vertical
integration in the video programming industry, Congress rejected proposals
to ban vertical integration and instead enacted “legislation bar[ring] cable
operators from discriminating against unaffiliated programmers” to ensure
“competitive dealings between programmers and cable operators.”
2. The 1993 FCC Order
[In October 1993, the FCC released an order establishing a procedural
framework for addressing § 616(a)(3) discrimination complaints by
unaffiliated networks against MVPDS. Under the framework, the FCC
would analyze complaints on a case-by-case basis and balance the need to
proscribe “behavior prohibited by the specific language of the statute” with
the need to preserve “the ability of affected parties to engage in legitimate,
aggressive negotiations.”].
3. The 2007 FCC Notice of Proposed Rule Making [(“2007 NPRM”)]
On June 15, 2007, the FCC issued a notice of proposed rule making that
solicited comments on potential changes to the procedures established in the
1993 FCC Order. Among other things, the FCC sought comment on the
need to clarify the elements of a prima facie § 616(a)(3) violation and to
“adopt rules to address the complaint process itself.” …
4. The 2011 FCC Order
… The FCC concluded that the record developed in response to the
2007 NPRM showed that its “current program carriage procedures [were]
ineffective and in need of reform.” Accordingly, in the 2011 FCC Order, the
agency stated that it was taking “initial steps to improve [its] procedures for
addressing program carriage complaints.” Among these steps were two rule
changes relevant to the petitions for this court's review: (a) pronouncement
of a new prima facie standard, and (b) creation of a standstill rule. [At issue
in this case is the 2011 FCC Order.].
a. Prima Facie Standard
[Instead of eliminating the prima facie standard, the FCC attempted to
clarify what was required to establish a prima facie case and codify those
requirements into FCC rules.].
Under the revised standard for a prima facie § 616(a)(3) violation, a
complaining unaffiliated network must show, first, that an MVPD
discriminated against it “on the basis of affiliation or non-affiliation” in the
“selection, terms, or conditions for carriage” of the MVPD's video
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programming. The network can make this showing by reference to either
direct or circumstantial evidence. [The Court explains the kinds of
circumstantial evidence that would show an MVPD discriminated against
an unaffiliated network on the basis of affiliation or non-affiliation.].
To demonstrate a prima facie violation, a complainant must further
show that the discrimination had the effect of “unreasonably restraining” its
ability “to compete fairly.” [Whether discrimination unreasonably restrains
the complainant’s ability to compete fairly is analyzed on a case-by-case
basis.].
*** Standstill rule section omitted
5. Time Warner's First Amendment Challenge
In releasing the 2011 FCC Order, the agency rejected Time Warner's
claim, made in response to the 2007 NPRM, that the program carriage
regime violated the First Amendment. Time Warner had argued that, insofar
as the program carriage regime required MVPDs to carry certain
unaffiliated networks on the same terms as affiliated networks, it constituted
a content-based infringement on MVPDs' editorial determinations of which
programming networks to provide to their subscribers. As such, it was
subject to strict scrutiny, which Time Warner maintained it could not
withstand because increased competition in the MVPD market had deprived
cable operators of any bottleneck power that might have justified the
regime's initial creation in 1992.
Construing the program carriage regime as content neutral, the FCC
applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to Time Warner's First
Amendment challenge, and concluded that, even with the increased
competition in the MVPD market, the program carriage regime continued to
serve important government interests in promoting competition and diverse
viewpoints. In so concluding, the FCC relied on the program carriage
discrimination provision of the Cable Act that “directed the Commission to
assess on a case-by-case basis the impact of anticompetitive conduct on an
unaffiliated programming vendor's ability to compete.”
The FCC further concluded that case-by-case analysis of unaffiliated
networks' complaints under the program carriage regime was narrowly
tailored to promote diversity and competition in the video programming
industry because it restricted an MVPD's speech only upon proof that the
MVPD had discriminated on the basis of network affiliation and that such
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discrimination unreasonably restrained a network's ability to compete fairly.
D. The Current State of the Video Programming Industry
[The Court describes how the video programming industry has become
more competitive since 1992. Today, cable operators’ market share is
smaller than it was in 1992. DBS providers, such as DIRECTV and DISH
Network, and OVDs now serve a significant portion of the market.
Additionally, many geographic areas are now served by multiple competing
MVPDs, usually the local cable operator and two DBS providers. Even
though competition has increased since 1992, many cable operators
continue to control significant market share in many areas.]. For example,
as of mid–2010, Comcast maintained at least a 40% share in 13 of the 20
largest MVPD markets in the United States, ranging from as low as 43% in
Houston to as high as 62% in Chicago and 67% in Philadelphia....
Since 1992, there also has been a decline in vertical integration among
cable operators and programming networks in the video programming
industry. At the same time, however, Time Warner maintains an ownership
interest in four national networks, including MLB Network; Cox
Communications has an interest in six national networks, including MLB
Network and the Travel Channel; Cablevision has an ownership in ten,
including AMC and IFC; and Bright House Networks has an interest in 29,
including Animal Planet and Discovery Channel. [In addition to owning
interests in national networks, cable operators own various regional news
and sports networks.].
Like Congress in 1992, the FCC continues to view the effects of vertical
integration on the video programming industry as mixed. While potential
benefits include “efficiencies in the production, distribution, and marketing
of video programming, as well as the incentive to expand channel capacity
and create new programming by lowering the risks associated with program
production ventures,” possible harms include “unfair methods of
competition, discriminatory conduct, and exclusive contracts that are the
result of coercive activity.”
E. The Instant Appeal
Upon issuance of the 2011 FCC Order, the Cable Companies timely
filed petitions for judicial review. They argue that the program carriage
regime violates the First Amendment in light of the current state of the
MVPD market....
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II. Discussion
A. First Amendment Challenge
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. There is no
question that cable operators and other MVPDs “engage in and transmit
speech” protected by the First Amendment. … Nor is there any dispute that
the program carriage regime regulates MVPDs' protected speech by
restraining their editorial discretion over which programming networks to
carry and on what terms. … The question here, then, is whether such
regulation is justified by a countervailing government interest under the
appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny.
[T]he Cable Companies contend that the FCC erred when, in issuing the
2011 FCC Order, it subjected the program carriage regime to intermediate
scrutiny. The Cable Companies submit that the regime's restrictions are
content and speaker based, thus requiring strict scrutiny. In any event, the
Cable Companies argue that the program carriage regime cannot survive
either strict or intermediate scrutiny.
On de novo review of this constitutional challenge to the 2011 FCC
Order…we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of
review and that the FCC program carriage regime satisfies that standard.
While rapidly increasing competition in the video programming industry
may undermine that conclusion in the not-too-distant future, that time has
not yet come. We thus deny the Cable Companies' petitions insofar as they
challenge the program carriage regime under the First Amendment.
1. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
“At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641. The
First Amendment thus stands against government “attempts to disfavor
certain subjects or viewpoints.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340
(2010). “Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. at 340. A content- or speaker-based restriction on protected speech
is subject to strict scrutiny and will be tolerated only upon a showing that it
is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. On the other hand,
a regulation of protected speech that is content neutral and that does not
disfavor certain speakers is reviewed under the less-stringent intermediate
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level of scrutiny. Courts have consistently reviewed challenges to the Cable
Act and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto under intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. at 213. Because the program carriage
regime is content and speaker neutral, it warrants no different treatment.
a. Content Neutrality
“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content
neutral is not always a simple task.” Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642. “The
principal inquiry ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of agreement or disagreement with the message it conveys.”
Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In making this
determination, “we look to the purpose behind the regulation.” Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001). “[T]ypically, government regulation of
expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Id. (emphasis in original;
alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)....
Applying these principles here, we conclude that § 616(a)(3) and (5) of
the Cable Act, by its terms, neither favors nor disfavors any particular
message or view and, indeed, makes no reference to content. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 536(a)(3), (5). To invoke the protections of that statute, an unaffiliated
network must establish that a cable operator or other MVPD (1)
discriminated against it on the basis of affiliation, or more precisely its lack
of affiliation with the MVPD, and (2) thereby unreasonably restrained its
ability to compete fairly. See id. § 536(a)(3). The statute thus prohibits only
discrimination on the basis of affiliation. It confers no protections based on
the content of an unaffiliated network's programming....
Moreover, the Cable Companies do not—and, in light of the statute's
legislative history, cannot—claim that the purpose of § 616(a)(3) and (5) is
to suppress any particular message or idea. Congress's concern in enacting
the statute “was not with what a cable operator might say,” but with the
possibility that, as a result of its bottleneck power and vertical integration
with affiliated networks, “it might not let others say anything at all in the
principal medium for reaching much of the public.” Time Warner Entm't
Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d at 1317–18. Congress enacted § 616(a)(3)
and (5) to minimize this threat, not to suppress any particular message or
viewpoint. Such a purpose is not content based.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the 2011 FCC Order's
prima facie standard. Under that standard, an unaffiliated network may
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show affiliation-based discrimination through (1) direct evidence or (2)
circumstantial evidence that an MVPD treated it differently than a
“similarly situated” affiliated network. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302(d)(3)(iii)(B). In
determining whether two networks are similarly situated, the FCC
acknowledges that it examines the content of the networks' programming.
See id. (stating that FCC considers, among other factors, “genre” and
“target programming”). In light of this examination, the prima facie
standard “ ‘might in a formal sense be described as content-based,’ “ but not
as that term has been employed by the Supreme Court. Cablevision Sys.
Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d at 717 (quoting BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d
58, 69 (D.C.Cir.1998)). Not only is there “absolutely no evidence” that “the
Commission issued its [prima facie standard] to disfavor certain messages
or ideas,” but also the Cable Companies point to no specific content that the
standard disfavors. Id.
That conspicuous omission from their argument is explained by a
simple fact: the prima facie standard, like § 616(a)(3) under which it was
promulgated, treats all content equally. Depending on the circumstances of
a given case, any content may weigh in favor of or against a finding that an
unaffiliated network is similarly situated to an affiliated network. But the
standard does not itself favor or disfavor particular content. To illustrate,
assume that an unaffiliated network devoted to sports files a § 616(a)(3)
complaint against a cable operator. If the cable operator is affiliated with a
sports network, the unaffiliated network's sports content will weigh in favor
of a finding that it is similarly situated. Meanwhile, if the cable operator is
not affiliated with a sports network, the unaffiliated network is less likely to
be found similarly situated. In either instance, though, it is the cable
operator's own content choice, not the government's, that determines
whether the unaffiliated network's sports content is favored.
Thus, the prima facie standard may favor certain content in one case
while disfavoring the same content in another case. But neither in its
adoption nor in its operation does the standard reflect government
“agreement or disagreement” with any particular ideas or viewpoints....
Where, as here, the government examines content to determine whether
a regulation applies, with no indication that the regulation favors or
disfavors any particular content, the concerns that compel strict scrutiny of
content-based laws are not present. … The program carriage regime
expresses no government content preference for particular ideas or
viewpoints. It simply prohibits MVPDs from discriminating against
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unaffiliated networks similarly situated to the MVPDs' affiliated networks.
As such, the regime is properly considered content neutral.
b. Speaker Neutrality
“[S]peaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the
Government's preference for the substance of what the favored speakers
have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say).”
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 658. But “[s]o long as they are not a subtle means of
exercising a content preference, speaker distinctions ... are not presumed
invalid under the First Amendment.” Id. at 645.
Here, the program carriage regime reflected in § 616(a)(3) and (5) of the
Cable Act and the FCC's prima facie standard does distinguish among
speakers. Unaffiliated networks are favored because the regime affords
protections to them that are not afforded to affiliated networks, i.e., it
prohibits affiliation-based discrimination that unreasonably restrains
unaffiliated networks' ability to compete fairly....
In asserting that strict scrutiny is warranted here, the Cable Companies
contend that all speaker-based regulations, regardless of whether they are
grounded in a content preference, are presumptively invalid. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument in Turner I. … Indeed, in that case, the Court
subjected a speaker-based regulation under the Cable Act to intermediate
scrutiny precisely because it did not reflect a content preference.
…
Accordingly, because the program carriage regime is neither content
based nor impermissibly speaker based, we subject it to intermediate
scrutiny.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
“[T]he intermediate level of scrutiny [is] applicable to content-neutral
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.” Turner I, 512 U.S.
at 662. Such a restriction will be sustained under this standard if it (1)
“advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of
free speech” and (2) “does not burden substantially more speech than
necessary to further those interests.” Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189 (citing
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The program carriage
regime satisfies these two requirements.

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 8, Page 92
Oct. 2013

a. Important Government Interests
The FCC submits that the program carriage regime serves two important
government interests by promoting (1) fair competition and (2) a diversity
of information sources in the video programming market. … The
government's “interest in eliminating restraints on fair competition is always
substantial, even when the individuals or entities subject to particular
regulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment.” Turner I, 520 U.S. at 664. “Likewise, assuring that the public
has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental
purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First
Amendment.” Id. at 663.…
… When, as here, “ ‘the government defends a regulation on speech as a
means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that
the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way.’ ” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664
(plurality)). Thus, the FCC's determination that the program carriage regime
protects against unfair competition and promotes diverse video
programming sources must be based on “ ‘reasonable inferences' “ drawn
from “ ‘substantial evidence.’ “ Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d at
1311 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666 (plurality))....
Applying these principles here, we begin by noting that the program
carriage regime calls for a “case-by-case” assessment of the anticompetitive
effect of an MVPD's purported discrimination against an unaffiliated
network. 2011 FCC Order ¶ 33. To justify such a regime, the FCC “has no
obligation to establish that vertically integrated cable companies retain a
stranglehold on competition nationally.” Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC,
649 F.3d at 712. Rather, it must show a reasonable basis for concluding that
some markets exist in which MVPDs have the incentive and ability to harm
unaffiliated networks and that application of the program carriage regime
will alleviate that harm. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195. The FCC has met
this burden.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that a law “impos[ing]
current burdens ... must be justified by current needs.” Shelby County v.
Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[The Court acknowledged a trend in the video programming industry over
the past twenty years toward increased competition—especially from DBS
providers, telephone companies, and OVDs—but noted that this trend has
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not yet eliminated the need for government regulation of MVPDs’ carriage
decisions. The Court recognized that if this trend continues, it may one day
eliminate the need for government intrusion. Despite the trend, however,
the Court concluded that such a day has not yet arrived.].
The industry's current competitive posture presents “a ‘mixed picture’
when considered as a whole.” Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d at
712 (quoting Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d at 1314). Cable
operators may not be as dominant as they were in 1992 when Congress
enacted the Cable Act. Nevertheless, cable operators continue to hold more
than 55% of the national MVPD market and to enjoy still higher shares in a
number of local MVPD markets....
Indeed, despite the Cable Companies' assertions to the contrary, the
2011 FCC Order cited substantial record evidence that cable operators
maintain significant shares in various local markets and that vertical
integration remains pervasive in the video programming industry. In
particular, the 2011 FCC Order relied on the 2011 Comcast/NBCU Order,
which points out that, as of mid–2010, Comcast held a more–than–60%
share in certain major MVPD markets. Additionally, the 2011
Comcast/NBCU Order explained that the vertical integration of Comcast,
the nation's largest cable operator and MVPD, with NBCU, the nation's
fourth largest owner of programming networks, provides Comcast with an
increased incentive and ability to harm unaffiliated networks.
From this record evidence, the FCC could reasonably conclude that
cable operators continue to “have the incentive and ability to favor their
affiliated programming vendors in individual cases, with the potential to
unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated programming vendor to
compete fairly.” 2011 FCC Order ¶ 33....
The record also permitted the FCC reasonably to conclude that the
program carriage regime would ameliorate the anticompetitive harm that
vertically integrated cable operators pose to unaffiliated networks. Under
that regime, when anticompetitive conduct is proved in a particular case, the
FCC has the authority to order remedies appropriate to that case. The
regime thus directly targets the threatened harm and provides the FCC with
the means to redress it. In so doing, it promotes important government
interests in fair competition and diversity of information sources in the
video programming market.
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b. Narrow Tailoring
To show that a regulation is narrowly tailored under intermediate
scrutiny, the government need not demonstrate that the regulation is “the
least speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government's interests.”
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662. It must, however, show that the “regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Narrow tailoring in this context requires, in other words, that the means
chosen do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further
the government's legitimate interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The program carriage regime is carefully tailored to avoid placing any
greater burden on MVPDs' editorial discretion than is warranted to promote
competition and diverse programming sources. The regime prohibits only
affiliation-based discrimination by MVPDs and only when such
discrimination is shown to have an anticompetitive effect. It does not
prohibit an MVPD from declining to carry an unaffiliated network because
it opposes the views expressed by that network. It does not prohibit MVPDs
from declining to carry an unaffiliated network for legitimate business
reasons. … Nor does it necessarily prohibit affiliation-based discrimination
in competitive markets, where there is a showing that such discrimination
has beneficial effects that are not anticompetitive. … Moreover, the regime
requires the FCC to evaluate individual unaffiliated networks' complaints on
a case-by-case basis, and it demands proof of impermissible affiliationbased discrimination and anticompetitive effect before any restrictions are
placed on the MVPD's carriage decision.
The Cable Companies nevertheless argue that the program carriage
regime is not sufficiently tailored because neither § 616(a)(3) nor the prima
facie standard established by the 2011 FCC Order explicitly requires an
unaffiliated network to demonstrate that a purportedly discriminating
MVPD possesses market power. The FCC responds that proof of market
power is not necessarily a prerequisite to relief under the regime. … The
program carriage regime requires an unaffiliated-network complainant to
make a case-specific showing that an MVPD “unreasonably restrain[ed]” its
ability to “compete fairly,” 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3), and market power is
generally a “significant consideration” under such a requirement, Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 (2007)
(identifying market power as “significant consideration” in determining
whether conduct is unreasonable restraint under § 1 of Sherman Act).…
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Thus, on this facial challenge to the overall program carriage regime, we
conclude that the regime's “unreasonable restraint” requirement renders it
narrowly tailored so as not to burden more speech than necessary to
advance the government's interests....
***
III. Conclusion
To summarize, we conclude as follows:
1. Section 616(a)(3) and (5) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, and the prima facie standard established thereunder by the
2011 FCC Order, are content and speaker neutral and, thus, petitioners' First
Amendment challenge warrants intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny.
The challenged program carriage regime satisfies intermediate scrutiny
because its case-specific standards for identifying affiliation-based
discrimination (a) serve important government interests in promoting
competition and diversity in an industry still posing serious competitive
risks, and (b) are narrowly tailored not to burden substantially more speech
than necessary to further those interests.
Accordingly, the petitions for review are DENIED . . . insofar as they
raise a First Amendment challenge to the program carriage regime . . . .
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. In Comcast, the concurring opinion stated that Section 616 of the Cable
Act applies “only when a video programming distributor possesses market
power.” It also stated “[i]n today's highly competitive market, neither
Comcast nor any other video programming distributor possesses market
power in the national video programming distribution market.” Does this
render the Cable Act currently irrelevant? How should the court’s approach
to “market power” change with the rise of innovative OVDs like Netflix, if
it should change at all? What about the merits of the conclusion that the
only cable company in town lacks market power because there are
alternatives that use different technologies (internet, satellite, etc)?
2. “Net neutrality,” or “internet neutrality,” refers very generally to a
principle that the internet be open, without undue private restrictions on
websites, platforms, contents, the types of equipment that can be attached to
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it. At a high level of generality the concept is pleasing, but implementation
has proven to be very difficult, in part because net neutrality can encompass
so many thing. Consider these definitions:
1. Absolute non-discrimination







2.

Limited discrimination without Quality of Service tiering (QoS)


3.

“Net Neutrality means that Internet service providers may not
discriminate between different kinds of content and applications
online. It guarantees a level playing field for all Web sites and
Internet technologies.”
Network neutrality is best defined as a network design principle.
The idea is that a maximally useful public information network
aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally. This allows
the network to carry every form of information and support every
kind of application. The principle suggests that information
networks are often more valuable when they are less specialized –
when they are a platform for multiple uses, present and future.”
“Net neutrality refers to the concept that a broadband network
should operate without any restrictions on the kinds of equipment
attached to it, or on the mode of communication allowed.”
“a neutral Internet must forward packets [of digital information] on
a first-come, first served basis, without regard for quality-of-service
considerations.”

United States lawmakers have introduced bills that would allow
quality of service discrimination as long as no special fee is charged
for higher-quality service.

Limited discrimination with tiering




This approach allows higher fees for QoS as long as there is no
exclusivity in service contracts. The principle is this: “If I pay to
connect to the Net with a certain quality of service, and you pay to
connect with that or greater quality of service, then we can
communicate at that level.”
“This allows higher fees for quality of service as long as there is no
exclusivity in service contracts. This means that nobody can have
exclusivity to any site, but each site can pay to have higher qualities
of service.”
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Consider the following possibilities:
1. An Internet subscriber uses an automated system to download
thousands of videos from the Internet, using 100 times as many
resources as the average subscriber to that internet service provider’s
(ISP) system. The ISP responds by disconnecting the customer,
placing a limit on the amount of data it can receive in a given time
period, or charging it a higher price.
2. An ISP owns a television network or other subsidiary that earns
money by transmitting video content, or perhaps owns a cable
television company that transmits video content; it then shuts down
a website that offers video content, such as Netflix.
3. An ISP shuts down a website that is relentlessly critical of the ISP’s
parent company.
4. In an effort to aid in the United State’s “War on Terror,” an ISP
refuses to allow costumers with “anti-American” names to access
websites that actively promote and encourage the destruction of the
American government.
5. An ISP charges private universities a higher price to access the
Internet than it does public universities.
In “Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices,”3
the Federal Communications Commission adopted guidelines for internet
service providers and other members of the internet industry:
1. “Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose
the network management practices, performance characteristics, and
terms and conditions of their broadband services;”
a. “A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the
network management practices, performance, and commercial
terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for
consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such
services and for content, application, service, and device
providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.”
b. The FCC requires broadband providers to disclose: Congestion
management practices, application-specific behavior practices,
device attachment rules, security practices, service description,
impact of specialized services description, pricing, privacy
3

Currently available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10201A1.pdf.
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policies, and redress options
2. “No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile
broadband providers may not block lawful websites, or block
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony
services; and”
a. The rule only protects lawful content. This rules entitles users to
use any device to connect to the network, so long as the device
does not do any harm to the network. …
3. “No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may
not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network
traffic.”
a. “A network management practice is reasonable if it is
appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network
management purpose, taking into account the particular network
architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access
service.”…
The purpose of these rules are to “ensure the Internet remains an open
platform— one characterized by free markets and free speech—that enables
consumer choice, end-user control, competition through low barriers to
entry, and the freedom to innovate without permission.”
The FCC concluded that had jurisdiction to establish these rules under
the Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act of 1996; that the
rules do not violate the First Amendment (because they are content neutral)
and do not constitute a Taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The FCC concluded the benefits of keeping the Internet open far
exceeds the costs. Internet interference would slow or break the cycle of
innovation and would cause harms “that may be irreversible or very costly
to undo.” Internet openness can solve this problem by reducing the risk of
harm as well as allowing end users unfettered access to information. The
costs of keeping the Internet open are very small. “Our rules against
blocking and unreasonable discrimination are subject to reasonable network
management, and our rules do not prevent broadband providers from
offering specialized services.”
The rules apply to “broadband Internet access service.” And apply only
“to the provision of broadband Internet access service and not to edge
provider activities, such as the provision of content or applications over the
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Internet.” The rules do not apply “to dial-up Internet access service because
telephone service has historically provided the easy ability to switch among
competing dial-up Internet access services.” Lastly, the rules do not apply to
coffee shops, Internet cafes, bookstores, or “other entities when they acquire
Internet service from a broadband provider to enable their patrons to access
the Internet from their establishments.”
3. Limits on the FFC’s Power to Enforce Network Neutrality Policy. In
Comcast Corp. v. Federal Commns. Comm'n 600 F. 3d 642 (D.C. Cir.
2010) the D.C. Circuit imposed significant limits on the FCC’s ability to
enforce its adopted net neutrality policies. The Communications Act of
1934 grants the FFC ancillary authority to “perform any and all acts, make
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the
Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. §
154(i). The FCC may exercise this “ancillary” authority only if it
demonstrates that its action is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.” In 2007 several
subscribers to Comcast's high-speed Internet service discovered that the
company was interfering with their use of peer-to-peer networking
applications. When the FCC intervened the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC
lacked the ancillary authority to regulate Comcast’s network management
policies. The court based its decision on a two-part test for ancillary
jurisdiction:
The Commission ... may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only
when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission's
general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2)
the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's
effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities.
The court found that the FCC had erroneously relied on statements of its
own policy which were unable to “anchor the exercise of ancillary
authority” instead of relying on statutorily mandated duties. Declarations
that “the policy of the United States . . . [is] to promote the continued
development of the Internet,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), or the FCC’s mandated
goal of providing “a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service,” 47 U.S.C. § 151, are able to “shed light on
any express statutory delegation of authority” but are unable to provide such
authority on their own. The court further held that, had it allowed the FCC
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to proceed with such regulation in the absence of explicit Congressional
support, it would have acted to “virtually free the Commission from its
congressional tether” and that there would then be few regulations that the
FCC would be “be unable to impose upon Internet service providers.”
Prior to Comcast the courts had generally held that the FCC’s
ancillary jurisdiction allowed it to pursue basic broadband policies by
ensuring transparency, protecting consumers’ privacy, ensuring that
persons with disabilities have access to broadband, protecting against
cyber-attacks, and preserving the free and open Internet. American
Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 694-96. Now, the FCC’s ancillary authority
is more limited that previously thought, requiring the Agency to develop
additional legal frameworks that will comply with the Comcast
decision.
On the ways available to the FCC control the internet and possible legal
limitations, see Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841 (2011).
What if the regulation is of content (such as limiting pornography) rather
than economic structure? See Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The
Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65, 92-114 (2011); Hannibal Travis, The FCC's New
Theory of the First Amendment, 51 SANTA CLARA L REV 417 (2011).
4. Unlike general ISPs (internet service providers), mobile service
providers such as Verizon and AT&T have significant discretion to decide
whether or not to allow certain mobile applications on their cellular devices.
At this writing this position is being challenged for “fail[ing] to protect
wireless users from discrimination, and … let[ting] mobile providers block
innovative applications with impunity.” Josh Levy, Net Neutrality: What’s
Mobile
Got
to
Do
With
It?
(2011),
http://www.savetheinternet.com/blog/11/09/30/net-neutrality-whats-mobilegot-do-it.
Does a mobile service provider who allows consumers to access the
Internet on its devices have an obligation equivalent to that of a traditional
ISP to provide open access to the Internet? Do you think the same
underlying consumer protection and open Internet policies will apply in this
case or will the mobile service provider’s role as the “middle man” be
enough to allow for greater discretion? For example, should the maker of a
Smartphone such as Apple be able to block an internet application such as
Skype, which might enable a customer to completely bypass the user’s
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subscription for cellphone minutes when a wi-fi internet connection is
available? Would antitrust law be a better way to deal with such problems?
3. Good writing on the internet as a public forum includes Derek E.
Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 UNIV. CHI.L.REV. 863 (2012); Brian
Leiter, "Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech," in SAUL
LEVMORE AND MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, EDS, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 155 (2010).

